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PROTECT DOWNWARD DEPARTURES:
CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE’S
INTRUSION INTO JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
Skye Phillips*
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the
man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place.
It may be a reflection on human nature, that such devices should
be necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is
government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human
nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls
on government would be necessary.1
INTRODUCTION
On October 9, 2003, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence of Jorge Santiago
who had pled guilty in district court to criminal possession of a
firearm.2 In addition, the Second Circuit affirmed the district
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2005; B.A., Vassar College, 1996. The
author would like to thank her parents and the Journal of Law and Policy staff
for their help and encouragement.
1
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 268-69 (James Madison) (George W. Carey
& James McClellan eds., 2001).
2
U.S. v. Santiago, No. 02-1217, 2003 WL 22318785, at *1 (2d. Cir. 2003).
The statute prohibits any person convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year from possessing a firearm. See 18
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2004). Under usual circumstances, the maximum penalty for
Santiago’s crime would be ten years’ imprisonment. Id. at *3. Santiago had been
convicted of two felony assault offenses and a drug trafficking offense,
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court’s denial of Santiago’s request, based on his unique family
circumstances, for a downward departure, a process by which
judges may adjust a criminal sentence based on aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.3
While Santiago’s case presents nothing out of the ordinary, his
request for a downward departure prompted a lively discussion
between the assistant U.S. attorney for the District of Connecticut
and the three judge panel hearing his appeal, which contained
Judges Guido Calabresi, Roger J. Miner, and Chester J. Straub.4
Judge Calabresi told the assistant U.S. attorney, “You’re telling
me . . . that the system we have set up, that has been set up by
Congress, which removes discretion from the judges, has given
discretion to your office, as a practical matter.”5 He continued,
“[This] is a fundamental objection to that system, that it takes
discretion from independent courts and gives it to dependent
prosecutors, who then have to answer to the attorney general and
other political figures. But that’s the system and it’s been held
constitutional, and here we are.”6 The assistant U.S. attorney
responded by telling Judge Calabresi that Santiago had accepted a
plea bargain based on the advice of his own attorney, but Judge
Miner interjected by saying “[i]f we go along with your adversary,
you’ll probably take our names and report them to the attorney
general.”7 Judge Straub immediately said, “Be sure you spell them
correctly. Especially Straub. S-T-R-A-U-B.”8
The three judge panel’s comments were in response to the
April 30, 2003 enactment, of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
however, when he was sixteen and seventeen years old. Id. at *1-2. As a result,
the district court sentenced him to a mandatory minimum term of fifteen years.
Id.
3
Id. at 3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2004).
4
Tom Perrotta, Panel Laments Lack of Judicial Discretion, N.Y.L.J., Oct.
28, 2003, at 1.
5
Id.
6
Id. The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the current
sentencing system in United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). See infra
Part II.B.
7
Perrotta, supra note 4, at 1.
8
Id.
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Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT
Act).9 The purpose of the PROTECT Act is to comprehensively
strengthen “law enforcement’s ability to prevent, investigate,
prosecute and punish violent crimes committed against children.”10
The PROTECT Act contains a number of provisions, however,
which are not limited to the protection of children and threaten to
reduce the input of the judiciary in the uniquely judicial area of
criminal sentencing.11 It includes a controversial amendment
authored by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and sponsored by
Representative Tom Feeney.12 The Feeney Amendment, as Judges
Calabresi, Miner, and Straub noted, threatens to curb judicial
discretion in criminal sentencing and may intimidate individual
judges in the performance of their traditional duties.13 For
approximately the past two decades pursuant to Congress’ mandate
to the United States Sentencing Commission (Commission), judges
have possessed the power to adjust criminal sentences in certain
circumstances to prevent unjust punishment.14 However, the
9

PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-2, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified in
scattered sections of 18, 28 and 42 U.S.C.).
10
Office of Public Affairs Press Releases, Dep’t of Justice, 04-30-03 FACT
SHEET PROTECT ACT (April, 2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/.
11
Recent Legislation–Congress Amends the Sentencing Guidelines in an
Attempt to Reduce Disparities, 117 HARV. L. REV. 751, 753-54 (2003)
(discussing the impact of the PROTECT Act on criminal sentencing). The
PROTECT Act, among other things, limits the composition of the Sentencing
Commission to “not more than three” federal judges. PROTECT Act §
401(n)(1), 28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2004). It changes the abuse of discretion standard
of appellate review to a de novo standard. PROTECT Act § 401(d)(2), 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(e) (2004). It also imposes new data collection provisions and reporting
requirements. PROTECT Act § 401(h), 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (2004).
12
Laurie P. Cohen & Gary Fields, Ashcroft Intensifies Campaign against
Soft Sentences by Judges, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2003, at A1.
13
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice at the
Federal Judges Association Board of Directors meeting (May 5, 2003), at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_05-05-03.html. Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist noted that the Feeney Amendment “could appear
to be an unwarranted and ill-considered effort to intimidate individual judges in
the performance of their judicial duties.” Id.
14
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt.
(2003). “The sentencing judge must select a sentence from within the guideline
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PROTECT Act threatens to rein in this check on excessive
criminal sentences and disrupt the balance of power in sentencing
between the three branches of government.15
This note argues that judicial discretion is a key component of
a just sentencing scheme and deserves protection from the current
attack by the Executive and Congress. Part I of this note describes
the historical background of judicial discretion in sentencing and
the emergence of sentencing disparity which ultimate led to
enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (SRA).16 Part II
of this note describes the statutory purposes of the Sentencing
Commission and the form and content of judicial discretion under
the Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) promulgated by the
Commission.17 Additionally, this part describes the Supreme
range. If, however, a particular case presents atypical features, the Act allows
the judge to depart from the guidelines and sentence outside the range.” Id.
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) noted that “[a]s enacted, the Feeney Amendment,
substantially reversed provisions allowing Federal judges to depart from
sentencing guidelines when justice requires.” 149 CONG. REC. S9115-02, 9115
(daily ed. July 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
15
149 CONG. REC. S9115-02, 9115 (daily ed. July 9, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy stated that the Feeney Amendment “effectively
overturned the basic structure of the carefully crafted sentencing guideline
system . . . . Not only have we compromised the sentencing system, but we have
alienated and minimized the effectiveness of our Federal judges . . . .” Id.
16
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
17
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt.
(2003).
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 changed the course of federal
sentencing. Among other things, the Act created the United States
Sentencing Commission as an independent agency in the Judicial
Branch, and directed it to develop guidelines and policy statements for
sentencing courts to use when sentencing offenders convicted of federal
crimes. Moreover, it empowered the Commission with ongoing
responsibilities to monitor the guidelines, submit to Congress
appropriate modifications of the guidelines and recommended changes
in criminal statutes, and establish education and research programs. The
mandate rested on Congressional awareness that sentencing was a
dynamic field that requires continuing review by an expert body to
revise sentencing policies, in light of application experience, as new
criminal statutes are enacted, and as more is learned about what
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Court’s involvement in the Guidelines and the transfer of
discretionary power to federal prosecutors resulting from
provisions of the Guidelines. Part III describes the legislative
history of AMBER Alert and the Feeney Amendment and argues
that Representative Feeney and the DOJ used AMBER Alert to
push through Congress their limitation on judicial discretion. This
part also argues that disparity in criminal sentencing is partly
attributable to the DOJ. Part IV argues that the Feeney
Amendment’s reduction of judicial discretion in sentencing raises
constitutional and fairness issues.
I.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION

Judicial discretion in sentencing has experienced several
historical shifts in accordance with the prevailing philosophy of
punishment.18 There are two general philosophies of punishment:
retribution or “just desert,” and utilitarianism.19 Utilitarianism
encompasses several models of crime control, including
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.20 Retributivism
motivates and controls criminal behavior.
Id.
18

Paul W. Tappan, Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 528, 529-30 (1958) (discussing the historical evolution of
sentencing and parole practices). One commentator noted that “[e]xperience has
shown that the ascendancy of any one of these [philosophies of punishment]
generally rests primarily on shifts in the political climate, not on some abstract
assessment of a given goal’s intrinsic value.” Developments in the Law–
Alternative Punishments: Resistance and Inroads, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1967,
1969 (1998) (discussing the way in which punishment is discussed in the United
States).
19
Paul J. Hofer & Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason Behind the Rules:
Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 40 AM.
CRIM. L. REV. 19, 85 n.6 (2003) (discussing the philosophical approach of the
federal sentencing guidelines).
20
Id. Criminal law textbooks have also treated deterrence, retribution,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation as distinct models of punishment.
Developments in the Law–Alternative Punishments: Resistance and Inroads,
supra note 18, at 1969. The deterrent model views man as a “pleasure-seeking,
pain-avoiding creature” and states that the “objective [of punishment] is to deal
with the criminal in such a way as to serve notice on potential offenders. To this
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suggests that punishment is a positive moral duty and does not rely
upon societal benefits.21 In essence, retributivism justifies
punishment because an offender deserves it and should suffer in
proportion to the offense or wrongdoing; it does not rely on the
positive consequences to society stemming from punishment.22 On
the other hand, utilitarianism focuses on the functions of
punishment with regard to the total maximization of benefits to the
community.23 Thus, the rehabilitative approach focuses on the
“individualization of punishment and working with the individual
in such a way that he will be able to make a satisfactory
adjustment, or at least a non-criminal adjustment, once he is
released from the authority of the state.”24 Judicial discretion
evolved into its most expansive form under the rehabilitative
end the focus is on the assignment of that appropriate penalty, no more, no less,
which will deter potential offenders from committing crimes.” THEORIES OF
PUNISHMENT 6-7 (Stanley E. Grupp ed., 1971). The incapacitation based system
“implicitly gives up on rehabilitative possibilities and on the possibilities of
deterring the specific criminals to which it is applied. It prevents crime in only
one way: by preventing the specific criminal from committing crimes during the
duration of his sentence.” Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of
Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 453, 464 (1997) (discussing models of crime control).
21
Andrew R. Strauss, Losing Sight of the Utilitarian Forest for the
Retributivist Trees: An Analysis of the Role of Public Opinion in a Utilitarian
Model of Punishment, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1549, 1558 (2002) (discussing the
various models of punishment).
22
Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just”
Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 859-60 (2002) (discussing the retributive
theory of punishment). The retributivist “defends the desirability of a punitive
response to the criminal by saying that the punitive reaction is the pain the
criminal deserves, and that it is highly desirable to provide for an orderly,
collective expression of society’s natural feeling of revulsion toward and
disapproval of criminal acts.” THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 5.
23
Strauss, supra note 21, at 1556-57. In describing the utilitarian theory of
punishment, Jeremy Bentham, an English philosopher and social reformer,
wrote that “[t]he general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in
common, is to augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore, in
the first place, to exclude, as far as may be, every thing that tends to subtract
from that happiness: in other words to exclude mischief.” THE COLLECTED
WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION 158 (J. H. Burns & H. L. A. Hart eds., 1996).
24
THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 20, at 8.
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model, which emerged in the latter half of the nineteenth century.25
A. Judicial Discretion Prior to the Sentencing Guidelines
Prior to this period, however, judicial discretion had a less
significant position in sentencing.26 From the War of Independence
until the 1870s, retribution was the primary purpose of
incarceration.27 Discretion over criminal sentencing resided largely
with the legislature.28 In the early 1800s judges began to receive
increased discretion but were still required to sentence within a
prescribed range of punishment.29 The Supreme Court noted that
during this period “‘the excessive rigidity of the [mandatory or
fixed sentence] system’ soon gave way in some jurisdictions . . . to
a scheme permitting the sentencing judge . . . to consider
aggravating and mitigating circumstances surrounding an offense,
and, on that basis, to select a sentence within a range defined by
the legislature.”30 Thus, while Congress established the sentence
25

Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion: The New Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMONOLOGY 883, 894 (1990)
(discussing the historical shifts in sentencing goals).
26
Id. at 892-93.
27
Id. at 893.
28
Id. at 892. Chief Justice Burger noted that “[i]n the early days of the
Republic, when imprisonment had only recently emerged as an alternative to the
death penalty, confinement in public stocks, or whipping in the town square, the
period of incarceration was generally prescribed with specificity by the
legislature.” United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45 (1978). The assertion
that the legislature had control over criminal sentencing, however, may be open
to debate. Two commentators have noted that proponents of mandatory
sentencing guidelines are disinclined to acknowledge that federal judges have
been entrusted with broad sentencing discretion since the beginning of the
Republic. KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
GUIDELINES AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 9 & 197 n.1 (1998). For example,
Congress enacted a criminal statute in 1789 which prescribed that upon
conviction for bribery of a customs official, the defendant “shall . . . be punished
by fine or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court . . ., so as the fine
shall not exceed one thousand dollars, and the term of imprisonment shall not
exceed twelve months.” Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
29
Nagel, supra note 25, at 892.
30
Grayson, 438 U.S. at 45-46 (quoting Paul W. Tappan, Sentencing Under
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for federal crimes and controlled the scope of judicial discretion,
the fixed penalty structure gave way to increased judicial
discretion.31
In the 1870s, the rehabilitative model of punishment began to
take hold.32 The rehabilitative model would fundamentally reshape
criminal sentencing for approximately the next one hundred
years.33 This model incorporated the idea that “[t]he supreme aim
of prison discipline is the reformation of criminals and not the
infliction of vindictive suffering.”34 The Supreme Court observed
in 1949 that “[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of
the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders have
become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”35 In
conjunction with the adoption of the rehabilitative model was the
the Model Penal Code, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 528, 529 (1958) (discussing
the historical evolution of sentencing and parole practices)). In addition, the
Court explained that “[n]evertheless, the focus remained on the crime: Each
particular offense was to be punished in proportion to the social harm caused by
it and according to the offender’s culpability. The purpose of incarceration
remained, primarily, retribution and punishment.” Grayson, 438 U.S. at 46
(citations omitted).
31
Nagel, supra note 25, at 893.
32
Id.
33
Grayson, 438 U.S. at 46. The Supreme Court noted:
Approximately a century ago, a reform movement asserting that the
purpose of incarceration, and therefore the guiding consideration in
sentencing, should be rehabilitation of the offender, dramatically
altered the approach to sentencing. A fundamental proposal of this
movement was a flexible sentencing system permitting judges and
correctional personnel, particularly the latter, to set the release date of
prisoners according to informed judgments concerning their potential
for, or actual, rehabilitation and their likely recidivism. Indeed, the
most extreme formulations of the emerging rehabilitation model, with
its “reformatory sentence,” posited that “convicts [regardless of the
nature of their crime] can never be rightfully imprisoned except upon
proof that it is unsafe for themselves and for society to leave them free,
and when confined can never be rightfully released until they show
themselves fit for membership in a free community.”
Id. at 46.
34
Nagel, supra note 25, at 893.
35
Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949).
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development of indeterminate sentencing, which embodied the
notion that a prisoner should be imprisoned until he had
reformed.36 Judges exercised very broad discretion under this
model as the legislature delegated more sentencing responsibility
to the judiciary.37 Although statutes specified the penalties for
crimes, the sentencing judge had wide discretion to decide whether
the offender should be incarcerated, the length of incarceration, or
whether probation or a fine should be imposed.38
Judges were not alone in exercising broad discretion within the
context of indeterminate sentencing.39 In 1910, Congress created
the United States Parole Board, located within the Executive
Branch, to determine the actual release date of federal prisoners.40
Reflecting the rise of progressive beliefs with regard to criminal
sentencing, parole officers determined when prisoners were

36

Nagel, supra note 25, at 893-94.
Id.
38
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
39
United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 46 (1978). Indeterminate
sentencing involved “a flexible system permitting judges and correctional
personnel, particularly the latter, to set the release date of prisoners according to
informed judgments concerning their potential for, or actual, rehabilitation and
their likely recidivism.” Id. Indeterminate sentencing involved the delegation of
authority to parole boards. Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Ne’er-Do-Well to the
Criminal History Category: The Refinement of the Actuarial Model in Criminal
Law, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 99, 112 (2003) (discussing the emergence of
parole in the twentieth century). The Supreme Court has noted that both
indeterminate sentencing and parole were “based on concepts of the offender’s
possible, indeed probable, rehabilitation, a view that it was realistic to attempt to
rehabilitate the inmate and thereby to minimize the risk that he would resume
criminal activity upon his return to society.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363. The
system of indeterminate sentencing “required the judge and the parole officer to
make their respective sentencing and release decisions upon their own
assessments of the offender’s amenability to rehabilitation.” Id. at 363.
40
William J. Powell & Michael T. Cimino, Prosecutorial Discretion under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: Is the Fox Guarding the Hen House?, 97 W.
VA. L. REV. 373, 378 (1995) (discussing twentieth-century federal indeterminate
sentencing). See An Act to Parole United States Prisoners, ch. 387, §§ 2-10, 36
Stat. 819 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4202-4208 (2000))
(repealed 1984).
37
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rehabilitated and could reenter society.41 Prisoners had to serve at
least one third of the nominal sentence, however, unless the judge
at the time of sentencing determined the offender was immediately
eligible for parole.42 Parole officers were viewed as experts who
would be able to make release decisions without succumbing to the
“politics of legislatures” or “the emotions of courtrooms.”43
Implicit to both systems was the ideal of individualized
sentencing.44 Thus, the judge and the parole officer exercised
broad discretion under this system.45
B. Sentencing Disparity and the Sentencing Reform Act of
1984
For over one hundred years prior to the adoption of the
Sentencing Reform Act, this system was in place.46 In the latter
half of the twentieth century, a growing discontent with this system
emerged.47 Beginning in the late 1960s, reform of the criminal
sentencing system became a priority.48 A major reason for the
41

Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing As Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L.
REV. 311, 326 (2003) (discussing the professionalization of the law of
punishment).
42
See An Act to Parole United States Prisoners, ch. 387, §§ 2-10, 36 Stat.
819 (1910) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 4202-4208 (2000)) (repealed
1984).
43
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 21.
44
Williams, 337 U.S. at 247. Justice Black explained in 1949 that the
“prevalent modern philosophy of penology [is] that the punishment should fit
the offender and not merely the crime. The belief no longer prevails that every
offense in a like legal category calls for an identical punishment without regard
to the past life and habits of a particular offender.” Id.
45
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363.
46
Nagel, supra note 25, at 894.
47
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983).
48
Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Congress
and the United States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291,
294-95 (1993) (discussing the background of reform leading to the enactment of
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984). Prior to this point, reform efforts focused
on revision of the substantive criminal law and criminal procedure. STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 28, at 27-29. The American Law Institute reformed the
substantive criminal law when it drafted the Model Penal Code in 1962. Id. at
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discontent with the rehabilitative model was its subjectivity, in that
it led to widespread sentencing disparity.49 One problem was the
difficulty in determining whether or when a prisoner was
rehabilitated.50 Another was that individual judges, absent statutory
guidance, applied their own notions of the purposes of
sentencing.51 Sentencing disparity, Congress recognized,
contradicts notions of fairness and certainty.52 For example, as of
1983, “the average federal sentence for bank robbery was eleven
years, but in the northern district of Illinois it was only five and
one-half years.”53 Congress deemed that parole officers and judges
29. During the 1960s, the Supreme Court implemented a variety of new
procedural restraints. Id. at 27 & 205 n.111. In addition, Congress established
the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws (the “Brown
Commission”) to propose a revision of federal criminal provisions. Feinberg,
supra, at 294. One commentator noted that “by proposing consistent, rational,
and fair classification of crimes, both efforts [the Model Penal Code and the
Brown Commission] paved the way for bolder, more comprehensive, sentencing
reform.” Id.
49
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983). Congress explained:
One offender may receive a sentence of probation, while another—
convicted of the very same crime and possessing a comparable criminal
history—may be sentenced to a lengthy term of imprisonment. Even
two such offenders who are sentenced to terms of imprisonment for
similar offenses may receive widely differing prison release dates; one
may be sentenced to a relatively short term and be released after
serving most of the sentence, while the other may be sentenced to a
relatively long term but be denied parole indefinitely.
Id.
50

Id.
Id.
52
Id.
53
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 41 (1983). A study was performed for the
Department of Justice in which:
208 active federal judges specified the sentences they would impose in
16 hypothetical cases, 8 bank robbery cases, and 8 fraud cases. In only
3 of the 16 cases was there a unanimous agreement to impose a prison
term. Even where most judges agreed that a prison term was
appropriate, there was a substantial variation in the lengths of prison
terms recommended. In one fraud case in which the mean prison term
was 8.5 years, the longest term was life in prison. In another case the
51
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were responsible for sentencing disparity.54
The widespread sentencing disparity stemming from discretion
in the criminal system led to increasing criticism from academic
circles and the political left during this period.55 The most
powerful voice for reform of judicial sentencing discretion came
from Judge Marvin E. Frankel, who served as a United States
District Judge in New York City.56 Judge Frankel wrote a book
describing the unchecked sentencing authority of judges as
“terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to
rule of law” and professed the view that “arbitrary cruelties [were]
perpetrated daily.”57 He called for the creation of an administrative
mean prison term was 1.1 years, yet the longest prison term
recommended was 15 years.
Id. at 44 (footnote omitted).
54
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 38 (1983). The Senate Report observed:
These disparities, whether they occur at the time of the initial
sentencing or at the parole stage, can be traced directly to the unfettered
discretion the law confers on those judges and parole authorities
responsible for imposing and implementing the sentence. This
sweeping discretion flows from the lack of any statutory guidance or
review procedures to which courts and parole boards might look.
Id. The SRA abolished parole. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt.
A, introductory cmt. (2003). The introduction to the Guidelines noted that “[t]he
Act requires the offender to serve virtually all of any prison sentence imposed,
for it abolishes parole and substantially restructures good behavior adjustments.”
Id.
55
See STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 33-34. For example, Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis of the University of Chicago Law School examined the
discretionary authority of a wide variety of actors in the criminal sentencing
scheme, including police, prosecutors, judges, and parole officials. Id. at 33. See
KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY. The
American Friends Service Committee, a Quaker organization devoted to service,
development, social justice, and peace programs throughout the world, called for
limits on judicial discretion and adoption of determinate sentencing. STITH &
CABRANES, supra note 28, at 34. See AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., STRUGGLE
FOR JUSTICE. A REPORT ON CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA, PREPARED
FOR THE AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE (1971).
56
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 35.
57
Id. at 35-36 (quoting MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW
WITHOUT ORDER).
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sentencing commission with the purpose of creating “binding
guides” on federal courts.58 Judge Frankel’s reform proposals were
taken up by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, a Democrat from
Massachusetts.59
In 1975, Senator Kennedy introduced legislation to establish a
Federal Sentencing Commission with the mandate of creating
sentencing guidelines to redress sentencing disparity.60 It was not
until nine years later that President Ronald Reagan signed the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.61 The passage of the Sentencing
Reform Act occurred in conjunction with a growing public fear of
crime and a determination by Congress and President Reagan to
“crack down” on criminals.62 The passage of the Sentencing
Reform Act made explicitly clear “the rejection of the
rehabilitative model and goals upon which past sentencing
decisions had been made, in favor of the new bases for sentencing
–to punish, to promote respect for the law, to deter, and to
incapacitate.”63 Thus, the rehabilitative model began its descent
from its position as the philosophical underpinning of criminal
sentencing.64
58

Id. at 36. A “detailed chart or calculus [would] be used . . . in weighing
the many elements that go into a sentence . . . that would include, wherever
possible, some form of numerical or other objective grading.” Id.
59
Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The
Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 223, 223 (1993) (discussing the legislative history of the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1984).
60
Id. at 224-25.
61
Id. (analyzing the legislative history and political compromises which
ultimately led to the enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984). See also
Feinberg, supra note 48, at 298-304. Beginning in 1975, Senator Kennedy
introduced versions of his reform bill in the next four Congresses before it was
passed in 1984. STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 38 & 208 n.4.
62
See Stith & Koh, supra note 59, at 258-59, 262.
63
Nagel, supra note 25, at 928.
64
Developments in the Law–Alternative Punishments: Resistance and
Inroads, supra note 18, at 1969. It has been noted that “[w]hether because of a
failure in implementation or a deeper psychological shift in attitude towards
criminals in the wake of rising crime rates, the rehabilitative model went into
decline in the mid-1970s.” Id.
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II. JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The creation of the new sentencing scheme begged the
question of what role judicial discretion would play under the
Guidelines. When it enacted the SRA, the main intent of Congress
with regard to judicial discretion was to ensure that judges had a
structure within which to operate while not abrogating their ability
to depart downward in appropriate cases: “The purpose of the
sentencing guidelines is to provide a structure for evaluating the
fairness and appropriateness of the sentence for an individual
offender, not to eliminate the thoughtful imposition of
individualized sentences.”65 The Supreme Court has also
emphasized the uniquely valuable role of the Judicial Branch in
criminal sentencing.66 Perhaps one of the unintended consequences
of the Guidelines, however, is to increase the prosecutorial
discretion in the criminal sentencing system.
A. Congress Creates the United States Sentencing
Commission
Congress created the United States Sentencing Commission
under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.67 It established the
Commission “as an independent commission” located in the
Judicial Branch.68 The President appoints the Commission’s seven
voting members by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.69 At the time of its creation, the Commission was
composed of “at least three” federal judges recommended to the
President by the Judicial Conference of the United States.70 The
65

S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 52 (1983).
See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989) (explaining that
judicial contribution to sentencing is appropriate because of the “experience and
expertise” of that branch).
67
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
68
28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2004).
69
Id.
70
28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (1984). Under the provisions of the PROTECT Act,
the composition of the Sentencing Commission is now limited to “not more than
66
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SRA transferred much of the sentencing authority previously
exercised by the judiciary to the Sentencing Commission.71 Even
though Congress delegated broad authority to the Commission to
create the Sentencing Guidelines, it provided detailed instructions
with regard to the rationalization of the sentencing process.72
Congress authorized the Sentencing Commission to establish
sentencing policies and practices for the federal criminal justice
system.73 The SRA established that the purposes of the sentence
imposed were to (1) reflect the seriousness of the offense, to
promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the
offense; (2) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3)
to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4)
to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most
effective manner.74 These purposes respectively are retribution,

three” federal judges. PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-2, § 401(n)(1), 117 Stat.
650 (2003) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)).
71
Powell & Cimino, supra note 40, at 380.
72
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt.
(2003).
73
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1) (2001). The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984
states:
The purposes of the United States Sentencing Commission are to—(1)
establish sentencing policies and practices for the Federal criminal
justice system that—(A) assure the meeting of the purposes of
sentencing as set forth in [the Act]; (B) provide certainty and fairness in
meeting the purposes of sentencing, avoiding unwarranted sentencing
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found
guilty of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient
flexibility to permit individualized sentences when warranted by
mitigating or aggravating factors not taken into account in the
establishment of general sentencing practices; and (C) reflect, to the
extent practicable, advancement in knowledge of human behavior as it
relates to the criminal justice process; and (2) develop means of
measuring the degree to which the sentencing, penal, and correctional
practices are effective in meeting the purposes of sentencing as set forth
in [the Act].
Id.
74
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D) (2004).
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deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.75 The SRA required
judges to consider these purposes of sentencing when imposing a
sentence.76 In particular, Congress instructed the Sentencing
Commission to create categories of offense behavior and offender
characteristics.77 For example, an offense behavior category might
consist of “bank robbery/committed with a gun/$2500 taken,” and
an offender characteristic category might be an “offender with one
prior conviction not resulting in imprisonment.”78 Congress
required the Commission to prescribe guidelines ranges that
specify an appropriate sentence for each class of convicted persons
determined by coordinating the offense behavior categories with
the offender characteristic categories.79
In addition, Congress instructed the Commission as to the form
and content of judicial discretion under the Guidelines.80 The SRA
provides that a court must impose a sentence within the applicable
guideline range unless “the court finds that there exists an
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree,
not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a

75

Mark Osler, Must Have Got Lost: Traditional Sentencing Goals, The
False Trail Of Uniformity And Process, And The Way Back Home, 54 S.C. L.
REV. 649, 654 (2003) (describing the goals of criminal sentencing).
76
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A)-(D).
77
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt.
(2003). The background commentary to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines notes
that the Act “delegates to the Commission broad authority to review and
rationalize the federal sentencing process. The statute contains many detailed
instructions as to how this determination should be made, but the most important
of them instructs the Commission to create categories of offense behavior and
offender characteristics.” Id. See the editorial note of U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2003) for the original text
of the introduction to the Sentencing Guidelines, which this section cites.
78
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt.
79
Id.
80
Id. The introduction to the Sentencing Guidelines noted that “[p]ursuant
to the Act, the sentencing court must select a sentence from within the guideline
range. If, however, a particular case presents atypical features, the Act allows
the court to depart from the guidelines and sentence outside the prescribed
range. In that case, the court must specify reasons for departure.” Id.
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sentence different from that prescribed.”81 Pursuant to this
approach, the introduction to the Sentencing Guidelines notes that
the Sentencing Commission “intends the sentencing courts to treat
each guideline as carving out a ‘heartland,’ a set of typical cases
embodying the conduct that each guideline describes.”82 If a case
falls outside the “heartland” of the applicable guidelines, the court
possesses the power to grant an upward or downward departure.83
The Sentencing Commission provided guidance to courts with
regard to the departure power by listing encouraged and
discouraged bases for departure.84 The Commission noted,
however, that it would be impossible to predict in advance all of
the bases for downward departures.85 Thus, the Guidelines provide
courts with residual authority to depart downward in appropriate
circumstances.86
Congress considered several different sentencing models to

81
82

18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (2003).
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt.

(2002).
83

Id. The Sentencing Guidelines note that “[w]hen a court finds an atypical
case, one to which a particular guideline linguistically applies but where conduct
significantly differs from the norm, the court may consider whether a departure
is warranted.” Id.
84
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 94 (1996). For example, “[i]f the
victim’s wrongful conduct contributed significantly to provoking the offense
behavior, the court may reduce the sentence below the guideline range to reflect
the nature and circumstances of the offense.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5K2.10 (2003). The Guidelines list several factors that the court
cannot take into account as grounds for departure. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (2002). For example,
grounds that are not relevant in the determination of a sentence are race, sex,
national origin, creed, religion, and socio-economic status. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.10 (2003).
85
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.0 (2002). “Circumstances
that may warrant departure from the guideline range pursuant to this provision
cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed and analyzed in advance.
The decision as to whether and to what extent departure is warranted rests with
the sentencing court on a case-specific basis.” Id.
86
Alan Vinegrad, The New Federal Sentencing Law, 15 FED. SENT. R. 310
(Vera Inst. Just.) (June 2003), at 2003 WL 22208841.
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guide the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines.87
At one end of the spectrum, Congress considered making the
sentencing guidelines advisory only.88 At the other end, Congress
considered a strict determinate sentencing model that would
virtually remove judicial discretion.89 Ultimately, Congress
directed the Sentencing Commission to adopt a “mandatory
guideline system” because it would be “successful in reducing
sentence disparities while retaining the flexibility needed to adjust
for unanticipated factors arising in a particular case.”90 Even
though the creation of federal sentencing guidelines reduced
judicial discretion, Congress continued to view such discretion as a
fundamental component of a viable sentencing scheme.91
B. The Supreme Court and the Sentencing Guidelines
In 1989, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
SRA in Mistretta v. United States.92 The petitioner, who was
convicted of selling cocaine, argued that Congress granted the
Commission excessive legislative discretion violating the
constitutional non-delegation doctrine and that the composition
and location of the Commission violated separation of powers
principles.93 The Court upheld the SRA’s delegation of authority to
the Sentencing Commission to establish sentencing policy because
the SRA set forth sufficient policies and standards to guide the
Commission’s formulation of the Guidelines.94
87

United States v. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989).
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 51 (1983). “The sentencing guidelines system will
not remove all of the judge’s sentencing discretion. Instead, it will guide the
judge in making his decision on the appropriate sentence.” Id.
92
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 410 (1989). Petitioner and
another were indicted in the United States District Court for the Western District
of Missouri on three counts in a cocaine sale. Id. at 370.
93
Id. at 370.
94
Id. at 379. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2001) for the SRA text delegating
authority to the Commission. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 371-79 for the Court’s
entire analysis of Mistretta’s delegation argument.
88
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The Court then turned to Mistretta’s separation of powers
argument.95 The Court began its analysis by affirming that the
principle of separated powers is essential to the maintenance of
governmental structure.96 The Court observed that the system of
checked power, contained within the separation of powers
principle, provides security against the tendency of each of the
separate Branches to aggrandize power at the expense of the
others.97 The practical application is that “provisions of law that
either accrete to a single Branch powers more appropriately
diffused among separate Branches or that undermine the authority
and independence of one or another coordinate Branch,” violate
separation of powers principles.98 The Court observed that
Congress’ creation of the Sentencing Commission was
constitutional provided that Congress had not vested powers in the
Commission that are “more appropriately performed by the other
Branches” or “that undermine the integrity of the Judiciary.”99
The petitioner argued that the SRA violated both of these
constitutional principles because the SRA required individual
95

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380.
Id. at 380. The Court wrote that it has “consistently given voice to, and
has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that,
within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three
coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.” Id. The Court
further noted that the “Framers did not require—and indeed rejected—the notion
that the three Branches must be entirely separate and distinct.” Id. Indeed, James
Madison defended the position of the Framers that the three Branches should not
be hermetically sealed by observing that separation of powers “d[oes] not mean
that these [three] departments have no partial agency in, or no controul over the
acts of each other,” but rather “that where the whole power of one department is
exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another
department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted.”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 251 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001).
97
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381-82. The Court observed that “this concern of
encroachment and aggrandizement . . . has animated our separation-of-powers
jurisprudence and aroused our vigilance against the ‘hydraulic pressure inherent
within each of the separate Branches to exceed the outer limits of its power.’”
Id. at 382 (citations omitted).
98
Id. at 382.
99
Id. at 385.
96
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Article III judges to exercise legislative authority through the
creation of sentencing rules and eroded the integrity and
independence of the Judiciary by requiring Article III judges to sit
on the Commission.100 With regard to Mistretta’s first argument,
the Court held that there was no per se rule against judicial
rulemaking.101 Congress may delegate nonadjudicatory functions
to the Judicial Branch that do not encroach upon the powers of
another Branch and comport to the central mission of the
Judiciary.102 Indeed, the Court suggested that the rulemaking duties
of the Sentencing Commission were particularly appropriate for
the Judicial Branch.103 The Court likened the role of the
100

Id. at 383-84. With regard to the first claim, Petitioner specifically
argued that the SRA unconstitutionally required the Judicial Branch to exercise
not only judicial authority but legislative authority in the creation of sentencing
policy. Id. at 383. Petitioner argued that “rulemaking authority” may be
exercised by Congress or delegated by Congress to the Executive, but may not
be delegated or exercised by the Judicial Branch. Id. Petitioner’s second claim
specifically argued that Congress threatened the independence of the Judiciary
by requiring that the judges on the Commission share their authority with nonjudges and by giving the President appointment and removal power over the
Commission’s members. Id. at 384. Petitioner argued further that “Congress,
consistent with the separation of powers, may not upset the balance among the
Branches by co-opting federal judges into the quintessentially political work of
establishing sentencing guidelines, by subjecting those judges to the political
whims of the Chief Executive, and by forcing judges to share their power with
nonjudges.” Id. at 384.
101
Id. at 386. The Court noted that “we specifically have held that
Congress, in some circumstances, may confer rulemaking authority on the
Judicial Branch.” Id. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941) (in
which the Court declared that Congress has power to “regulate the practice and
procedure of federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or
other federal courts authority to make rules not inconsistent with the statutes or
Constitution of the United States”).
102
Id. at 388. The Court noted that, by established practice, it had
recognized Congress’ power to create entities, such as the Judicial Conference
of the United States, comprised of judges and non-judges, which do not exercise
judicial power in the constitutional sense of deciding cases and controversies,
but share the common purpose of providing for the fulfillment of responsibilities
that are properly the province of the Judiciary. Id. at 388-89.
103
Id. at 380-90. The Court stated:
Thus, although the judicial power of the United States is limited by
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Commission in promulgating the Guidelines to the accepted role of
the Supreme Court in establishing rules of civil and criminal
procedure under various enabling Acts.104 Thus, the Court upheld
the location of the Commission in the Judicial Branch.105
The Court also upheld the composition of the Sentencing
Commission.106 The Court determined that the SRA did not
undermine the integrity of the Judicial Branch by mandating that
the Commission contain “at least three” federal judges because the
SRA does not conscript judges to serve on the Commission107 and
the Constitution does not prevent Article III judges from
participating in certain extrajudicial activities such as serving on
express provision of Article III to “Cases” and “Controversies,” we
have never held, and have clearly disavowed in practice, that the
Constitution prohibits Congress from assigning to courts or auxiliary
bodies within the Judicial Branch administrative or rulemaking duties
that, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, are “necessary and
proper . . . for carrying into execution all the judgments which the
judicial department has power to pronounce.” Because of their close
relation to the central mission of the Judicial Branch, such extrajudicial
activities are consonant with the integrity of the Branch and are not
more appropriate for another Branch.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
104
Id. at 391. The Court noted: “Such guidelines, like the Federal Rules of
Criminal and Civil Procedure, are court rules—rules, to paraphrase Chief Justice
Marshall’s language in Wayman, for carrying into execution judgments that the
Judiciary has the power to pronounce.” Id. Petitioner argued in response that the
analogy between the Guidelines and the rules of procedure is flawed because
creating sentencing policy is substantive in nature. Id. at 392. The Court
responded that separation of powers analysis does not turn on the labeling of an
activity but rather on the “unique aspects of the congressional plan at issue and
its practical consequences in light of the larger concerns that underlie Article
III.” Id. at 393. First, the Court explained that because Congress vested the
power to create sentencing guidelines in an independent agency, rather than a
court, Congress did not combine legislative and judicial power within the
Judicial Branch. Id. at 394. Second, locating the Sentencing Commission in the
Judicial Branch did not inappropriately accumulate power in that Branch
because prior to the passage of the Act, the Judicial Branch “decided precisely
the questions assigned to the Commission.” Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 395.
105
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 395.
106
Id. at 397-412.
107
Id. at 405-06.
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the Commission.108 The Court affirmed that the Judiciary’s
involvement in the “political work” of the Commission would not
undermine public confidence in the disinterestedness of the
Judicial Branch because “[j]udicial contribution to the enterprise of
creating rules to limit the discretion of sentencing judges does not
enlist the resources or reputation of the Judicial Branch in either
the legislative business of determining what conduct should be
criminalized or the executive business of enforcing the law.”109
Indeed, the Court affirmed the importance of having a “significant
judicial voice” on the Commission.110 Finally, the Court held that
the President’s removal power does not threaten judicial
independence because a federal judge, absent impeachment, would
continue to have tenure under the “good behavior” provision of the
Constitution.111 Thus, the Supreme Court held that Congress
neither unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the
Sentencing Commission nor violated the separation of powers
doctrine.112
Issues surrounding the SRA reached the Court again in Koon v.
United States.113 The Supreme Court explicitly approved the
“heartland” approach contained in the Sentencing Guidelines and
the ability of judges to depart on non-specified grounds.114 Koon
concerned the prosecution of the Los Angeles Police Department
officers who were sentenced to thirty months imprisonment for
beating Rodney King.115 The officers appealed their convictions

108

Id. at 404.
Id. at 407.
110
Id. at 408.
111
Id. at 410. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §1.
112
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989).
113
518 U.S. 81 (1996).
114
Vinegrad, supra note 86. See supra text accompanying notes 82-83
(discussing the “heartland” approach).
115
Koon, 518 U.S. at 86-90. The District Court departed downward eight
levels. Id. at 85. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected the District
Court’s rulings, and, over the published objection of nine of its judges, declined
to rehear the case en banc. Id. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
determine the appropriate standards of appellate review of a district court’s
decision to depart from the Guidelines. Id.
109
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and the Government appealed the sentences.116 The Court observed
that district judges must impose a sentence within the guideline
range if the case is an “ordinary” one.117 While directing
sentencing courts to bear in mind the Commission’s expectations
that departures on non-specified grounds will be “highly
infrequent,” the Court affirmed the ability of judges to depart
outside the heartland in appropriate circumstances.118
In addition, the Court addressed the appropriate standard of
review in departure cases.119 The SRA established appellate review
in criminal sentencing.120 Prior to Koon, the SRA directed
appellate courts to accept a sentencing judge’s findings of fact
unless they were “clearly erroneous” and to give “due deference”
to the judge’s application of the Guidelines to the facts.121 The
Sentencing Commission put in place appellate mechanisms to
provide recourse to the defendant for an upward departure or to the

116

Id.
Id. at 92.
118
Id. at 96. The Supreme Court explained that a sentencing court
considering a downward departure should ask four questions:
1) What features of this case, potentially, take it outside the Guidelines’
“heartland” and make of it a special, or unusual, case? 2) Has the
Commission forbidden departures based on those features? 3) If not,
has the Commission encouraged departures based on those features? 4)
If not, has the Commission discouraged departures based on those
features?
Id. at 95.
119
Id. at 96.
120
Michael Goldsmith & Marcus Porter, Lake Wobegon and the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines: The Problem of Disparate Departures, 69 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 57, 66 (2000) (discussing appellate review of district court departure
decisions).
121
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (1995).
The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the
district court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept
the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly
erroneous and . . . shall give due deference to the district court’s
application of the guidelines to the facts.
Id.
117
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government for a downward departure.122 It did not, however,
articulate the standard of review.123 Subsequently, in Koon, the
Supreme Court determined that the appellate court should not
review the departure decision de novo, but rather should apply the
abuse of discretion standard.124 The Court noted that the text of the
SRA reveals congressional intent that district courts retain much of
their traditional sentencing discretion.125 Additionally, in 1988
Congress amended the Guidelines to further emphasize the unique
position of the district judge in determining the appropriate
sentence.126 The language of the 1988 amendment imposed the
requirement that the courts of appeals “give due deference to the
district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.”127
C. Downward Departures
Departures afford a method to avoid mechanical application of
the Sentencing Guidelines in appropriate circumstances.128 United
States v. Vanleer provides an example of a case in which
mechanical application of the Guidelines would have resulted in an

122

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt.
(2002). “If the court sentences within the guideline range, an appellate court
may review the sentence to determine whether the guidelines were correctly
applied. If the court departs from the guideline range, an appellate court may
review the reasonableness of the departure.” Id.
123
Id. See also 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).
124
Koon, 518 U.S. at 91.
125
Id. at 97. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
126
Koon, 518 U.S. at 97. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
127
Koon, 518 U.S. at 97. After all, the Senate Report stated at the time of
the creation of the Guidelines that “[t]he sentencing provisions of the reported
bill are designed to preserve the concept that the discretion of a sentencing judge
has a proper place in sentencing and should not be displaced by the discretion of
an appellate court.” S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 150 (1983).
128
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 51-52 (1983). The Senate Report noted that
“[t]he committee does not intend that the guidelines be imposed in a mechanistic
fashion. It believes that the sentencing judge has an obligation to consider all the
relevant factors in a case and to impose a sentence outside the guidelines in an
appropriate case.” Id. at 52.
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excessive sentence.129 The defendant in that case had a history of
non-violent criminal offenses related to his use of illegal drugs and
had served time in prison for forgery.130 Prior to becoming a
convicted felon, the defendant had given his shotgun to a friend.131
Following his release from prison, the defendant needed money
and took the shotgun to a pawn shop.132 During the transaction, he
gave the sales clerk his correct name, address, and fingerprint to
verify his identity.133 About one month later, a police officer
conducted a record check and determined that the defendant was a
convicted felon.134 The defendant pled guilty to being a felon in
possession of a firearm.135 The appropriate sentencing range for
this crime was 30 to 37 months.136 Vanleer requested a downward
departure.137 The court explained that the basis for the downward
departure was that the crime did not “threaten the harm or evil”
intended to be prevented by the statute.138 In granting the
downward departure, the deciding judge affirmed that
“departures—both downward and upward—are a critical
129

270 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (D. Utah 2003).
Id. at 1319.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Vanleer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1319.
136
Id.
137
Id.
138
Id. The Guidelines explain:
[C]onduct may not cause or threaten the harm or evil sought to be
prevented by the law proscribing the offense at issue. For example,
where a war veteran possessed a machine gun or grenade as a trophy,
or a school teacher possessed controlled substances for display in a
drug education program, a reduced sentence might be warranted.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.11 (2003). Here, the harm or evil
the law sought to prevent was violent crimes leading to personal injury or death.
VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1326. The defendant’s conduct naturally did not
threaten this because, in the words of the court, “VanLeer briefly possessed the
gun only because he intended to dispose of the gun . . . . When a felon acts
illegally to get rid of a firearm, that criminal offense is simply less culpable than
when a felon continually possesses a firearm.” Id. at 1326.
130
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component of the sentencing guideline scheme.”139 VanLeer was
merely attempting to get rid of his gun to pay his rent so it would
have been an unjust result for Vanleer to serve a full sentence.140
In addition, departures contribute to the development of the
Guidelines by providing feedback to the Commission on the way
in which courts are applying the Guidelines.141 Congress created a
duty on the part of the Sentencing Commission to periodically
review and revise the Guidelines.142 The appropriate judge or
139

Id. at 1320.
Id. at 1326-27.
141
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt.
(2002). The Sentencing Commission notes that:
First, it is difficult to prescribe a single set of guidelines that
encompasses the vast range of human conduct potentially relevant to a
sentencing decision. The Commission also recognizes that the initial set
of guidelines need not do so. The Commission is a permanent body,
empowered by law to write and rewrite guidelines, with progressive
changes, over many years. By monitoring when courts depart from the
guidelines and by analyzing their stated reasons for doing so and court
decisions with references thereto, the Commission, over time, will be
able to refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when departures
should and should not be permitted.
Id. One commentator noted that “[a]ccording to reformers, an articulation and
review of the reasons for deviating from the guidelines’ presumptive sentences
would provide meaningful feedback for the continuous evolution of sentencing
law and policy within the guidelines system.” Douglas A. Berman, Balanced
and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence that Undermines the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 34 (2000)
(discussing departure jurisprudence under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines).
Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., the President of the American Bar Association, noted that
“the departure power is a means of providing feedback from judges to the
Sentencing Commission and Congress. By studying departure patterns, the
Commission can identify those guideline rules that judges are consistently
finding to be inappropriate for certain classes of defendants.” Letter from Alfred
P. Carlton, Jr., President of the American Bar Association to Senator Orrin G.
Hatch, (Apr. 1, 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/departures.
142
28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2004). The Commission is responsible for:
(a) Collecting systematically the data obtained from studies, research,
and the empirical experience of public and private agencies concerning
the sentencing process; (b) publishing data concerning the sentencing
process; (c) collecting systematically and disseminating information
140

PHILLIPSMACRO.DOC

4/23/2004 1:25 PM

FEENEY AMENDMENT & JUDICIAL DISCRETION

973

judicial officer is required to submit to the Commission a report.143
The Commission uses the report to compile data files on federal
sentencing practices to inform the decision-making process of
amendments to the Guidelines.144 The result of the compilation
process is that if particular portions of the Sentencing Guidelines
are causing unjust results or failing to reflect changes in views on
punishment of specific crimes, then the Sentencing Commission
must adjust the Guidelines accordingly.145 This review process
involves consulting with authorities and representatives of the
Federal criminal justice system and recommending to Congress
modifications of the Guidelines for which an adjustment appears

concerning sentences actually imposed, and the relationship of such
sentences to the statutory purposes of sentencing set forth in [the
Sentencing Reform Act]; (d) collecting systematically and
disseminating information regarding effectiveness of sentences
imposed; and, (e) maintaining and making available for public
inspection a record of the final vote of each member on any action
taken by it.
Public Access to Sentencing Commission Documents and Data, 54 Fed. Reg.
51279, 51279-80 (Dec. 13, 1989) (citations omitted).
143
28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (amended by Pub.L. 108-21, § 401(h)). Subsection
(w) formerly read:
The appropriate judge or officer shall submit to the Commission in
connection with each sentence imposed (other than a sentence imposed
for a petty offense, as defined in title 18, for which there is no
applicable sentencing guideline) a written report of the sentence, the
offense for which it is imposed, the age, race, and sex of the offender,
information regarding factors made relevant by the guidelines, and such
other information as the Commission finds appropriate. The
Commission shall submit to Congress at least annually an analysis of
these reports and any recommendations for legislation that the
Commission concludes is warranted by that analysis.
Id.
144
Charles Loeffler, An Overview of U.S. Sentencing Commission Data, 16
FED. SENT. R. 14 (Vera Inst. Just.) (Oct. 2003), at 1, available at 2003 WL
23269265.
145
28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(C) (2004). The purposes of the United States
Sentencing Commission are to “reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in
knowledge of human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process.” Id.
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appropriate.146
D. Federal Prosecutors and the Sentencing Guidelines
While the Sentencing Guidelines served to limit discretion
exercised by judges, they transferred power over the sentencing
system to the Executive.147 The federal prosecutor determines the
charges against an offender, which directly impacts the sentencing
range applied to the offender’s crime.148 The transfer of power to
the federal prosecutor is evident in the relevant conduct and
departure provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines.149 Under the
Guidelines, the “relevant conduct” provision provides for the
consideration in sentencing of alleged offender-conduct related to
the offense, but not presented to the jury under the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard.150 The decision whether to raise the
146

28 U.S.C. § 994(r) (2004). The authorities involved in the consultation
include the United States Probation System, the Bureau of Prisons, the Judicial
Conference of the United States, the Criminal Division of the United States
Department of Justice, and a representative of the Federal Public Defenders. 28
U.S.C. § 994(o).
147
Powell & Cimino, supra note 40, at 373.
148
Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing, 28 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 161, 190 (1991) (noting that “[n]ot only does [the prosecutor] determine
who should be charged and what the charges should be, but the information that
he controls largely determines the time to be served by the offender.”).
149
Powell & Cimino, supra note 40, at 384-95. Two commentators noted
that “[p]erhaps nowhere in the Sentencing Guidelines is the discretion of the
prosecutor, and the opportunity to abuse that discretion, more visible than in
Section 1B1.3 of the Sentencing Guidelines, innocently entitled ‘Relevant
Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range).’” Id. at 384.
150
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.3 (2003).
Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guideline Range) (a)
Chapters Two (Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjustments). Unless
otherwise specified, (i) the base offense level where the guideline
specifies more than one base offense level, (ii) specific offense
characteristics and (iii) cross references in Chapter Two, and (iv)
adjustments in Chapter Three, shall be determined on the basis of the
following: (1) (A) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the
defendant; and (B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity
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relevant conduct of an offender at sentencing is within the sole
discretion of the prosecutor.151 The federal prosecutor retains the
discretion to indict and charge the most readily provable offense
and introduce the remaining charges at the sentencing hearing in
which there are lower standards of admissibility and proof.152
(a criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the
defendant in concert with others, whether or not charged as a
conspiracy), all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, that occurred
during the commission of the offense of conviction, in preparation for
that offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid detection or
responsibility for that offense; (2) solely with respect to offenses of a
character for which §3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple
counts, all acts and omissions described in subdivisions (1)(A) and
(1)(B) above that were part of the same course of conduct or common
scheme or plan as the offense of conviction; (3) all harm that resulted
from the acts and omissions specified in subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2)
above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and omissions; and
(4) any other information specified in the applicable guideline. (b)
Chapters Four (Criminal History and Criminal Livelihood) and Five
(Determining the Sentence). Factors in Chapters Four and Five that
establish the guideline range shall be determined on the basis of the
conduct and information specified in the respective guidelines.
Id. One commentator noted that “[i]n jury conviction cases, the ‘relevant
conduct’ standard allows the AUSA to introduce evidence of another crime at
the sentencing stage that was withheld from trial because the AUSA could not
prove it ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in
the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers,
101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1714 (1992) (discussing the background of the relevant
conduct provision under the Guidelines).
151
Powell & Cimino, supra note 40, at 389.
152
Id. at 388-89. U.S. v. Ebbole illustrates the unjust consequences that can
result from this system. See United States v. Ebbole, 917 F.2d 1495 (7th Cir.
1990). There, the defendant was sentenced to seven years and eight months in
federal prison after pleading guilty to distributing a gram of cocaine to an
undercover police officer. Id. at 1495. The plaintiff’s presentence report
contained evidence that he had purchased 1.7 kilograms of cocaine in the time
period surrounding the encounter with the undercover police officer. Id. The
court noted that had the report contained only the quantities that the plaintiff
pled guilty to distributing then the sentencing range would have been 27 to 33
months. Id. at 1495-96. Plaintiff argued that “due process requires that judges
have the discretion to discount penalties imposed for uncharged conduct because
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The departure provisions of the Guidelines have also enhanced
prosecutorial discretion.153 The Sentencing Guidelines provide that
the court may depart from the Guidelines upon motion of the
government stating that the defendant has provided substantial
assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person
who has committed an offense.154 Although the sentencing judge
retains final authority to impose the departure, the judge may
exercise this power only with prosecutorial approval.155 It is within
prosecutorial discretion, therefore, to alter the sentence of an
offender by making a substantial assistance motion.156 Thus, the
Guidelines have enhanced the role of the federal prosecutor in
criminal sentencing.157
III. AMBER ALERT AND CONGRESS’ ENACTMENT OF THE FEENEY
AMENDMENT AND THE PROTECT ACT
As Congress has the power to determine the scope of judicial
discretion, the enactment of the Feeney Amendment raises the
question whether Congress is dissatisfied with the level of judicial
discretion currently exercised by federal judges. On the surface it
may appear so.158 Representative Feeney and the DOJ evaded a
the prosecution need establish such acts by only a preponderance of the evidence
presented for sentencing purposes.” Id. at 1496. The court held that application
of the relevant conduct provision did not deny defendant but that the relevant
conduct provision of the Guidelines invites the prosecutor to indict for a less
serious offense and then expand them at sentencing. Id. at 1501. The court
further noted that in this case, the “United States Attorney’s office appears to
have accepted this dubious invitation.” Id.
153
Powell & Cimino, supra note 40, at 389-95.
154
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2001).
155
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 76.
156
Powell & Cimino, supra note 40, at 390.
157
Heaney, supra note 148, at 190.
158
How Will Judicial Discretion Change under the Feeney Amendment?,
N.Y.L.J., Feb. 23, 2004, at M12. Judge John S. Martin, of the Southern District
of New York, who resigned last year in protest over the Feeney Amendment,
observed:
Everybody talks about the Feeney Amendment, and they say, well, this
is what Congress wanted. Hogwash . . . . Because, if the Justice
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meaningful debate, however, on the underlying implications of
their measure to reduce judicial discretion by attaching it in a last
minute maneuver to the AMBER Plan, a widely supported
legislative effort to codify a successful system that works to
quickly locate kidnapped children.159
A. Congress and Amber Alert
In 1997, the AMBER (America’s Missing: Broadcast
Emergency Responses) Plan, a partnership between lawenforcement agencies and broadcasters to activate an urgent
bulletin in child-abduction cases, was created in response to the
kidnapping and murder of Amber Hagerman in Arlington,
Texas.160 In 2001, the National Center for Missing & Exploited
Department were so sure that this is what Congress wanted, why did
they use stealth tactic? Why didn’t they allow Congress to hold
hearings, and hold these issues up to the light of day, and say: “Is this a
problem?”
Id.
159

149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6712 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy noted that “[b]ecause the Feeney Amendment
was introduced at the last possible moment, Congress was deprived of full and
balanced information on whether departure decisions are made in inappropriate
instances.” Id. In addition, Senator Kennedy observed:
[The Feeney Amendment] has nothing to do with protecting children,
and everything to do with handcuffing judges and eliminating fairness
in our federal sentencing system. Its provisions effectively strip Federal
judges of discretion to impose individualized sentences, and transform
the longstanding sentencing guidelines system into a mandatory
minimum sentencing system.
149 CONG. REC. S7528-01, 7531 (daily ed. June, 9, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy). Senator Leahy noted that “House Republicans saddled the bipartisan,
non-controversial AMBER Alert bill with numerous unrelated and ill- conceived
provisions, collectively known as the ‘Feeney Amendment’ . . . .” 149 CONG.
REC. S9115-02, 9115 (daily ed. July 9, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
160
Nat’l Ctr. for Missing and Exploited Children, About AMBER Plan, at
http://www.missingkids.com (last visited Mar. 6, 2004). In response to the
murder of Amber Hagerman, the Dallas/Fort Worth Association of Radio
Managers joined local law-enforcement agencies in northern Texas to develop a
warning system to quickly locate abducted children. Id. Once law enforcement
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Children (NCMEC) launched the AMBER Plan to assist localities
with creating their own emergency alert plan.161 Subsequently, a
series of high-profile kidnappings demonstrated the need for
legislative action in this area to encourage adoption of AMBER
Alert plans nationwide.162 As a result, the National Amber Alert
Network Act of 2002 was introduced in the Senate and House,
respectively as S. 2896 on September 3, 2002, and H.R. 5326 on
September 4, 2002.163
The main thrust of the National Amber Alert Network Act of
2002 was to create a national AMBER alert system to assist local
and state authorities in tracking kidnappers who attempt to cross
state lines.164 The bill authorized the Attorney General, in
cooperation with the Secretary of Transportation and the Chairman
authorities receive notification about an abducted child, they determine whether
the situation warrants an alert. Id. If it does, alert information is compiled
including descriptions and pictures of the missing child, the suspected abductor,
a suspected vehicle, and any other information available and valuable to
identifying the child and suspect. Id. The information is sent to designated radio
stations under the Emergency Alert System (EAS). Id. The radio stations send
the information to area radio and television stations where it is immediately
broadcast. Id. Some states also employ electronic highway billboards, typically
used to disseminate traffic information to drivers, to alert the public of abducted
children. Id.
161
Id.
162
148 CONG. REC. H7048-01, 52 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2002) (statement of
Rep. Jackson-Lee). Representative Sheila Jackson-Lee (D-TX) stated that
throughout “the country we have seen a rash of children being abducted . . . .
Still, the vast majority of America’s communities have not established an Amber
Plan to protect our children. That is why it is critical that Congress moves to
build on the success of the AMBER Plan.” Id.
163
H.R. REP. NO. 107-723(I), at 90 n.1, 2 (2002). On September 3, 2002,
Senators Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and Kay Hutchinson (R-TX) introduced S.
2896. Id. at n.2. On September 4, 2002, Representatives Martin Frost (D-TX)
and Jennifer Dunn (R-TX) introduced H.R. 5326, the companion bill in the
House of Representatives. Id. at n.1.
164
Id. at 89. Representative Royce (R-CA) stated that there “is no national
coordination . . . . With the recent expansion of the AMBER Alert Program, a
system is needed to ensure that neighboring states and communities will be able
to honor each other’s alerts when an abductor is traveling with the child to other
parts of the country.” 148 CONG. REC. NO. H7048-01, 7053 (daily ed. Oct. 7,
2002) (statement of Rep. Ed Royce).
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of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to appoint a
National AMBER Alert Coordinator to direct the Alert’s
communication network regarding abducted children.165 The bill
also created two federal grant programs to assist and encourage
states to implement the costly AMBER Alert system.166 S. 2896
quickly passed the Senate on September 10, 2002.167
H.R. 5326 stalled in the House, however, because House
Judiciary Committee Chairman F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (RWI) introduced his own legislation, H.R. 5422, which included the
provisions of H.R. 5326 but added several other measures.168
165

Patrick Leahy, An Amber Alert Nationl [sic] System, CONG. TESTIMONY,
Sept. 4, 2002, available at 2002 WL 25098327.
166
Id. The bill provided funding for statewide notification and
communication systems, including overhead electronic highway notification
boards, along highways. Id. In addition, it provided a grant program managed by
the Attorney General for the support of AMBER Alert communications plans
with law enforcement agencies and others in the community. Id.
167
H.R. REP. NO. 107-723(I), at 90 n.3.
168
News Advisory, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on the Judiciary,
Sensenbrenner Introduces Comprehensive Child Abduction Prevention Bill
(Sept. 24, 2002), at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/news0924
02.htm. H.R. 5422 included H.R. 4679, providing judges with discretion to
permit supervision of released sex offenders for a maximum of life, which
passed the House by a vote of 409-3 but was blocked in the Senate. Id. It also
included H.R. 1877, adding new wiretap provisions relating to sexual crimes
against children, which passed the House by a vote of 396-11 but was blocked in
the Senate. Id. It also contained H.R. 4477, dealing with persons who travel to
foreign countries to engage in sexual activities with minors, which passed the
House by a vote of 418-8 but was blocked in the Senate. Id. H.R. 5422 also
included H.R. 2146, establishing mandatory life imprisonment for twiceconvicted child sex offenders, passing the House by a vote of 382-34 and
blocked in the Senate. Id. The concern of opponents of H.R. 5422 was that if the
Senate had refused to pass these controversial measures before, then the
AMBER Plan provisions would not be implemented because the Senate would
refuse to pass a bill saddled with the same provisions it had already refused in
the past. See 148 CONG. REC. H7048-01, 7051 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2002)
(statement of Rep. Scott) (explaining that if “the Senate has not seen fit to take
any of them up because they do not have sufficient merit, now or in the last
three Congresses, why would we think the Senate would see more merit in them
with more new death penalties and additional mandatory minimums?”). Of
particular concern was that H.R. 5422 contained a “two strikes you’re out”
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Opponents of the extra provisions called for the enactment of a
clean Amber Alert bill.169 In reaction to the stalemate, President
Bush, on October 2, 2002, urged the Republican leadership in the
House to pass the AMBER Alert legislation, S. 2896, drafted by
provision which mandated life imprisonment if the offender had a prior sex
conviction in which a minor was the victim, unless the sentence of death was
imposed. Id. The “two strikes you’re out provision” was controversial because
of its broad definition of sexual activity, which included consensual sexual
activity between an 18-year old and his 14-year-old girlfriend. Id. Another
serious concern was the bill would have a disproportionate affect on Native
Americans because it only applied where there was federal jurisdiction. Id.
Additionally, victims may be reluctant to come forward to report sex crimes by
family members if the victim knows the offender will serve life without parole.
Id.
169
H.R. REP. NO. 107-723(I), at 89 (2002). Representatives John Conyers,
Jr. (D-MI), Howard L. Berman (D-CA), Robert C. Scott (D-VA), and Melvin L.
Watt (D-NC), all Democratic members of the House Judiciary Committee,
explained in the dissenting view in the House report:
We are very disappointed with the approach being taken by the
Majority to deal with the very serious problem of child abduction . . . .
Bipartisan legislation was introduced . . . that would create a national
Amber alert system to assist local and state authorities in tracking
kidnappers that attempt to cross state lines. That bipartisan bill quickly
passed the Senate and it should have quickly passed the House and
been sent on to the president. Instead, what we have is a bill that
includes the non-controversial Amber alert provisions and far more
controversial provisions concerning death penalties, mandatory
minimum sentences, wiretap extensions, pre-trial release, and a whole
host of other unrelated provisions.
Id. Opposition to H.R. 5422 focused, in part, on its mandatory minimum
sentences and death penalty provisions. H.R. REP. 107-723(I), at 89-90 (2002).
Representatives Conyers, Berman, Scott, and Watt stated:
The majority knows that many on this side of the aisle cannot as a
matter of principal support the death penalty and mandatory minimum
sentences, particularly with all of the problems we have seen in these
areas in this country . . . . Namely, the unacceptably high rate of
wrongful convictions, inadequate legal representation and a system that
is applied in a racially discriminatory manner . . . . Mandatory
minimum sentences have been studied extensively and have been
shown to be ineffective in preventing crime, to distort the sentencing
process and to be a considerable waste of taxpayers’ money.
Id.
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Senators Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) and Diane Feinstein (DCA), which was the same as the original legislation, H.R. 5326,
introduced in the House.170 Bush explained that “[t]he House
hasn’t acted yet, so I am going to,” and announced the
implementation of a modified version of AMBER Alert.171 He also
stated that “[i]f possible, it would be very helpful if the House
passed the Hutchison-Feinstein law before they go home.”172
Nevertheless, on October 8, 2002, the House approved
Representative Sensenbrenner’s bill, H.R. 5422, by a 390-24
margin.173 There was not enough time left in the legislative
session, however, to reconcile the two different versions passed by
the House and Senate.174
The National Amber Alert Network Act was reintroduced in
Congress at the beginning of the next legislative session.175 The
bill unanimously passed the Senate on January 21, 2003.176 On
March 5, 2003, Chairman Sensenbrenner introduced H.R. 1104,
which was virtually identical to H.R. 5422.177 Chairman
170

Bush Promotes ‘Amber Alert’ System; House Urged to Pass Bill
Targeting Child Kidnappings, WASH. POST, Oct. 3, 2002, at A02.
171
Id. President Bush’s plan called for the placement of an AMBER Alert
coordinator at the DOJ and the designation of $10 million to “AMBER training
and education programs and to facilitate the use of overhead electronic highway
message boards and other systems as part of AMBER Alert Plans.” President
Bush Announces Immediate Action to Improve AMBER Alert System, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 2, 2002, at 2002 WL 22072232.
172
Bush Promotes ‘Amber Alert’ System; House Urged to Pass Bill
Targeting Child Kidnappings, supra note 170, at A02.
173
House Overwhelmingly Passes Comprehensive Child Abduction
Prevention Legislation; Sensenbrenner Urges Swift Senate Action, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, Oct. 8, 2002, 2002 WL 22072456.
174
Bush Promotes ‘Amber Alert’ System; House Urged to Pass Bill
Targeting Child Kidnappings, supra note 170, at A02.
175
H.R. REP. NO. 108-47(I), at 110 n.1, 2 (2003). On January 9, 2003, the
National AMBER Alert Network Act of 2003 was reintroduced as S.121 by
Senators Feinstein and Hutchinson. H.R. REP. NO. 108-47(I), at 110 n.2 (2003).
On January 28, 2003, the companion bill was reintroduced as H.R. 412 by
Representatives Frost and Dunn. H.R. REP. NO. 108-47(I), at 110 n.1 (2003).
176
H.R. REP. NO. 108-47(I), at 110 n.2 (2003).
177
H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. (2003), available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
Chairman Sensenbrenner stated that “[H.R. 1104] is virtually identical to H.R.
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Sensenbrenner (R-WI) argued that a stand-alone AMBER bill
would merely codify current practice and that a more
comprehensive approach was required to address the problem of
child abductions.178 The same concerns remained, however, that
implementation of the AMBER plan would fail due to
congressional divisiveness over an AMBER Alert bill encumbered
with controversial provisions.179 Meanwhile, on January 13, 2003,
5422, which overwhelmingly passed the House last October by a vote of 390 to
24. Like so many other meritorious bills sent to the other body in the last
Congress, this legislation was allowed to die by the Democrat leadership.” 149
CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2405 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Sensenbrenner).
178
149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2406 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2003) (statement of
Rep. Sensenbrenner). Representative Melvin L. Watt (D-NC) stated, however,
that:
I am struck by the argument that the chairman of our committee has put
forward to us. On the one hand, he says the AMBER Alert part of this
bill really does nothing that is not already able to be done, and then I
scratch my head and I said, well, if that is the case, why are we even
here doing the AMBER Alert part of this? Is the AMBER Alert part of
this bill, which all of us feel so strongly about, which all of us would
vote for in a heartbeat if it were a stand-alone bill, is it being used as a
bus to load on all of these other controversial provisions that otherwise
would not be considered? If these other provisions have merit, let them
be considered as separate stand-alone bills, let us evaluate them, let us
evaluate their impact on reducing crime and addressing the problems
that exist in our Nation, and let the Senate and the House vote on those
things separately.
Id. at 2408-09 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep. Watt).
179
149 CONG. REC. S5137-01, 5138 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Leahy). Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) stated:
Twice now we rapidly passed our bill through the Senate on
unanimous, bipartisan votes-last fall and again in January. Both times
House leaders chose not to pass it, instead delaying its assured passage
into law by using the bill as a “sweetener” for a package of other
controversial provisions that the Senate has not previously
considered . . . . Had House leaders opted to stand up and do what is
right from the beginning, we would already have a nationwide AMBER
Alert system in place to save our children’s lives when they are
abducted. We will never know how many children could have been
saved by a nationwide AMBER Plan-if the House had simply passed
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S. 151, the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools against the
Exploitation of Children Today Act (PROTECT Act of 2003), was
introduced in the 108th Congress by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT)
to address virtual child pornography.180 Senator Patrick Leahy (DVT) was the principal cosponsor.181 The Senate passed the
PROTECT Act, S. 151, on February 24, 2003.182 On March 27,
2003, the House took up H.R. 1104, the Child Abduction
Prevention Act, which incorporated the text of S. 151.183
As the debate between proponents of a clean AMBER Alert
bill and those favoring Representative Sensenbrenner’s
controversial bill continued in the House, Representative Tom
Feeney (R-FL) introduced an amendment to H.R. 1104.184 The
DOJ drafted the version of the Feeney Amendment introduced by
Representative Feeney.185 The Feeney Amendment as introduced
would have virtually eliminated the ability of judges to depart
downward from the Guidelines, thereby eliminating the thoughtful
imposition of sentences encouraged by Congress at the time of the
enactment of the SRA.186 Debate on the Feeney Amendment was
limited to twenty minutes.187 The Feeney Amendment presents yet
our bill when the Senate did, I daresay the number of children rescued
from their abductors and death would be much higher. Efforts to
protect our children do not deserve to be used as pawns by groups who
play politics by attaching it to more controversial measures.
Id.
180

S. REP. NO. 108-2, at 1-2 (2003).
Id.
182
S. 151, 108th Congress, available at http://thomas.loc.gov.
183
House Overwhelmingly Approves Child Protection Legislation; Includes
Amber Alert, Strong Penalties Against Kidnappings, Other Protections, supra
note 173. See generally 149 CONG. REC. S5113-01, 5114-15 (daily ed. Apr. 10,
2003). See also S. 151, 108th Congress, available at http://thomas.loc.gov, for
the bill summary of S. 151.
184
149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2420 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of
Rep. Feeney).
185
Cohen & Fields, supra note 12, at A1. Representative Feeney said that
he was the “messenger” of the amendment that was drafted by two Justice
Department officials. Id.
186
See supra text accompanying notes 65, 91.
187
See H.R. Res. 106, 108th Cong. (2003), available at
181
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another example of attempts by certain members of Congress to
manipulate the valid and uncontroversial goals of the AMBER
Alert bill.188 The amendment passed by a vote of 357 to 58.189
One reason members of the House may have voted for H.R.
1104, however, is because of concern and frustration over the
delay in enactment of the AMBER Alert portions of the bill.190
Protection of children is a highly charged issue, particularly in
light of the recent spate of high profile kidnappings, but the issue
was virtually lost in the controversial measures that were attached
to the AMBER Plan.191 The AMBER Plan is a highly successful
http://thomas.loc.gov/ (limiting debate on Rep. Feeney’s amendment to twenty
minutes).
188
149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2423 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of
Rep. Scott). Representative Scott state in opposition to Representative Feeney’s
proposal that “this amendment would have the effect of turning the sentencing
guidelines into mandatory sentences in the cases it affects. We have not had
hearings or markups on this matter; and this is not the way we should amend the
sentencing guidelines, without thought or consideration.” Id.
189
VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d. 1318, 1321 (D. Utah 2003). See also United
States v. Mellert, No. CR 03-0043, 2003 WL 22025007, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July
30, 2003).
190
149 CONG. REC. H3059-02, 3072 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of
Rep. Kilpatrick). Representative Kilpatrick stated in the subsequent conference
committee report on the PROTECT Act:
It is vital that we implement AMBER Alert systems, not just in our
local communities, but nationwide. Our efforts to crack down on child
abductors and abusers will be fruitless if we cannot transcend state
borders quickly enough to catch these vicious criminals . . . . There are
many provisions in this bill that, while attempting to deter these
criminals from committing such heinous acts, infringe upon the
livelihoods of many innocent individuals and prohibit what would
normally be harmless, legal acts. I vote for the H.R. 1104, the House
version of this conference report in hopes that conferees would come
together and agree upon a bill that would attack the key issue at hand,
protecting our children from molesters and pedophiles. After reviewing
the conference report, I did not see any substantive alterations or any
elimination of these bad provisions, but rather I noticed additional
provisions that, again, hurt the livelihood of innocent individuals and
legal acts.
Id.
191
149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2406 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of
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system to recover kidnapped children; it does not involve the
sentencing and punishment of criminals.192 Indeed, attaching the
largely unrelated provisions of the Feeney Amendment to the
AMBER Alert bill made it difficult for those legislators who
opposed the DOJ’s attack on judicial discretion to oppose H.R.
1104.193 Thus, the Feeney Amendment was included in the version
the House passed.194 On April 10, the different versions passed by
the Senate and House went to a Conference Committee to resolve
the differences between them.195
B. The Original Feeney Amendment
The original Feeney Amendment contained a “Sentencing
Reform” provision that would have restricted downward
departures in all cases.196 Downward departures would be
Rep. Scott). Representative Scott stated:
Last Congress, many of us warned the majority that coupling the
AMBER Alert bill with controversial sound bites would mean that
neither the AMBER Alert nor the sound bites would be passed, but the
House passed the same kind of omnibus bill anyway; and, as expected,
the whole thing died in the Senate. Yet, here we are again facing the
same misguided strategy and this time again with even more reasons
for the Senate to reject the bill which the AMBER Alert bill is buried
in.
Id.
192
Nat’l Ctr. for Missing and Exploited Children, About Amber Plan, at
http://www.missingkids.com (last visited Dec. 1, 2003).
193
Lawrence S. Goldman, The Feeney Amendment, 27 CHAMPION 4, 4
(June 2003) (discussing passage of the Feeney Amendment). One commentator
observed that “[a] vote against Amber Alert would have been like a vote against
motherhood and few legislators were willing to have to defend such a vote to
their constituents.” Id.
194
House Again Passes Virtual Child Porn Ban, WARREN’S WASH.
INTERNET DAILY, Mar. 28, 2003, at 2003 WL 16116966.
195
See 149 CONG. REC. S5113-01 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) for the record
of the Conference Committee meeting.
196
149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2423 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of
Rep. Feeney). “This would eliminate ad hoc departures based on vague grounds,
such as ‘general mitigating circumstances.’” Id. His proposal, however, met
opposition:

PHILLIPSMACRO.DOC

986

4/23/2004 1:25 PM

JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY

permissible only to the extent that the grounds had been
“affirmatively and specifically identified as a permissible ground
of downward departure in the sentencing guidelines or policy
statements,” which would eliminate the “heartland” approach
adopted by the Supreme Court in Koon.197 Additionally, the
original Feeney Amendment required courts of appeals to review
de novo the district court’s application of the Guidelines.198 It also
required the Attorney General, not later than 15 days after a district
court’s grant of a downward departure in any case, other than a
case involving a downward departure for substantial assistance, to
report the departure to the House and Senate Committees on the
Judiciary, setting forth the facts involved and the identity of the
district court judge.199 Additionally, it required the Chief Judge of
each district to submit a written report in every criminal case to the
Sentencing Commission with sentencing, offense, and offender
information, and required the Commission to make the reports and
underlying documents available to the House and Senate
Committees on the Judiciary.200 The DOJ did not notify or consult

This amendment would have the effect of turning the sentencing
guidelines into mandatory sentences . . . . The purpose of the
sentencing guidelines is to provide intelligent consistency in
sentencing, considering each sentence within the overall framework of
other sentences, and ensuring that the more serious crimes get more
serious punishment.
149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2423 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Scott).
197
Provisions of Original Feeney Amendment as Introduced and Passed by
the House of Representatives March 27, 2003, 15 FED. SENTENCING REP. 336,
June, 2003, at 1. See § 401(a)(2)(A). The specific offender characteristics which
would have warranted downward departure included age and extraordinary
physical impairment. Id. at 2. Drug, alcohol, or gambling dependence or abuse
was not a reason for imposing a sentence below the guidelines. Id. See also 149
CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2420 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Feeney).
198
Provisions of Original Feeney Amendment as Introduced and Passed by
the House of Representatives March 27, 2003, supra note 197, at 4. See §
401(d)(2).
199
Id. at 8. See § 401(l)(1).
200
Id. at 6. See § (h)(1)-(3).
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with the Sentencing Commission in advance of the introduction of
the Feeney Amendment in the House.201
Proponents of the limitations on judicial discretion contained in
the Feeney Amendment explained that judges had been departing
from the Guidelines at an increasing rate since Koon because the
decision underscored the available justifications for departures.202
Representative Feeney introduced the amendment to “address the
long-standing and increasing problems of downward departures
from the Federal sentencing guidelines.”203 The DOJ supported the
original version of the Feeney Amendment because it “enacts longoverdue reforms to address the longstanding, and still-growing,
problem of downward departures from the Sentencing
Commission’s Federal Sentencing Guidelines.”204 Representative
Feeney explained that the rate of downward departures for reasons
other than providing substantial assistance to federal prosecutors
increased 51 percent from fiscal year 1997 to fiscal year 2001.205
The DOJ explained in a letter to Congress supporting the original
Feeney Amendment that the rate of departures in non-immigration
cases has climbed from 9.6 percent in 1996 to 14.7 percent in fiscal
year 2001.206
201

Cohen & Fields, supra note 12, at A1. Commissioner Michael O’Neill
said that “Clearly, you’d like to have had a lot more debate.” Id.
202
Tom Perrotta, Foes of Limits on Sentence Departures Make Headway,
N.Y. L. J., Apr. 10, 2003, at col. 4. Representative Feeney stated that Koon gave
the “green light” to district courts who have increasingly granted downward
departures since the decision. Tom Feeney, Reaffirming the Rule of Law in
Federal Sentencing, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, July 1, 2003, at 2003 WL 74961888.
203
149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2422 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of
Rep. Feeney).
204
Perrotta, supra note 202, at col. 4.
205
Feeney, supra note 202. According to Representative Feeney, the rate of
downward departures in fiscal year 1997 was 12.1 percent compared to 18.3
percent in fiscal year 2001. Id.
206
Letter from Justice Department Supporting Original Feeney
Amendment, 15 FED. SENT. R. 355 (Vera Inst. Just.) (June 2003), at 2, at 2003
WL 22208851. The DOJ’s statement that the downward departure rate in cases
other than substantial assistance and immigration has climbed to 14.7 percent in
FY2001 conflicts with the Sentencing Commission’s date which places the rate
at 10.2 percent. See supra text accompanying note 211.
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Representative Feeney did not explain, however, that although
the rate of non-substantial assistance departures has increased since
the Koon decision, the vast majority of that increase is attributable
to the fact that the number of departures in “fast-track” border
districts more than tripled, from 1871 in 1996, to 5928 in 2001.207
In fiscal year 2001, 79 percent of downward departures were
requested by the Government.208 Thus, the DOJ has requested the
majority of non-substantial assistance departures since Koon.209
Indeed, the Sentencing Commission noted that policies
implemented in districts with a high volume of immigration cases
may affect departure rates.210 The non-substantial assistance
departure rate without those districts reduced to 10.2 percent.211
Furthermore, Senator Kennedy suggested the DOJ may have
misled Congress because its letter of support did not mention that
the Senate Report accompanying the SRA had anticipated a

207

Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President of the American Bar
Association to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, (Apr. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/departures.
Fast-track programs were established by United States Attorneys
offices to expedite the prosecution of immigration cases; if an
immigration offender pleads guilty in a timely fashion, the prosecutor is
authorized to pursue an additional downward departure. Importantly,
until the PROTECT Act, these departures were not authorized by the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The fast-track programs are no longer
limited to immigration cases, prosecutors now have extended them to
drug cases and do not limit their use to Southwestern border districts,
but use them also in other high-volume or port-of-entry districts.
NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, NACDL FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES COMMITTEE ANALYSIS, at http://www.nacdl.org/departures (last
visited Nov. 12, 2003).
208
Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President of the American Bar
Association to Senator Orrin G. Hatch 3 (Apr. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/departures (noting that “[i]n FY 2001, of 19,416
downward departures awarded federal defendants, approximately 15,318 came
on government motion.”)
209
Id.
210
Letter from the United States Sentencing Commission to Senators Hatch
and Leahy 1 (Apr. 2, 2003), at http://www.nacdl.org/departures.
211
Id.
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departure rate of about 20 percent.212 The actual departure rate of
10.2 percent reached without the inclusion of government
authorized fast track departures is substantially lower than the 20
percent anticipated by Congress.213
Opposition to the Feeney Amendment centered on the
sentencing and downward departures provisions and the attempt of
the DOJ and Representative Feeney to push their amendment
through Congress without any input from the Sentencing
Commission, bar associations, or the federal judiciary.214 Senators
Kennedy and Leahy expressed concern that the Feeney
212

149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6711 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy stated:
The Justice Department . . . submitt[ed] a highly misleading letter on
April 4th expressing its “strong support” for the Amendment. The
Department argued that the Amendment was justified because an
epidemic of lenient sentences was undermining the Sentencing Reform
Act. It failed, however, to mention that the committee report
accompanying the 1984 Act anticipated a departure rate of about 20
percent. Today, the rate at which judges depart from the guidelines over
the objection of the government is slightly more than 10 percent-well
within acceptable rates. The Department claimed that there are too
many downward departures from the sentencing guidelines, but it failed
to mention that, according to the American Bar Association, almost 80
percent of these departures are requested by the Justice Department
itself.
Id.
213
S. REP. NO. 98-225, 425 n. 193 (1983) (citation omitted). The Senate
Report stated that:
The United States Parole Commission currently sets prison release
dates outside its guidelines in about 20 percent of the cases in its
jurisdiction. It is anticipated that judges will impose sentences outside
the sentencing guidelines at about the same rate or possibly at a
somewhat lower rate since the sentencing guidelines should contain
recommendations of appropriate sentences for more detailed
combinations of offense and offender characteristics than do the parole
guidelines.
Id.
214
Perrotta, supra note 202, at col. 4. See Materials from Interested Groups
Opposing Original Feeney Amendment, 15 FED. SENT. R. 346 (Vera Inst. Just)
(June 2003), at 2003 WL 22208850, for letters and press releases written in
opposition to the original Feeney Amendment.
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Amendment, with its broad impact on judicial discretion, had been
passed by the House with virtually no debate.215 The voting
members of the Sentencing Commission expressed concern that
the review and analysis procedures of the Commission had been
bypassed.216 They also acknowledged congressional concern over
215

149 CONG. REC. S5137-01, 5145 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement by
Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy stated:
The substance of the Hatch-Sensenbrenner amendment-whether in the
form that was voted on in conference, or in the form that was circulated
after the conference adjourned-is just as outrageous as the way in which
it was adopted. This amendment modifies in very limited ways the
Feeney amendment, which was added to the bill on the House floor
after only 20 minutes of debate. This far- reaching proposal will
undermine the Federal sentencing system and prevent judges from
imposing just and responsible sentences. In short, it amounts to an
attack on the Federal judiciary.
Id. Senator Kennedy stated that:
In the final hours of the consideration of the AMBER bill in the House
of Representatives, there was an amendment to the AMBER bill
offered by Congressman Feeney. In a period of 20 minutes, it was
accepted without any hearings. It was a part of the conference. The
Feeney amendment affected the whole issue of sentencing, not just for
these kinds of heinous crimes that take place against children but also
against the underlying concept of our criminal sentencing provisions,
affecting every type of criminal sentence, whether we are talking about
terrorists, murderers, burglars or white-collar crime. The amendment
had nothing to do with the abduction of children, but would affect all of
the other circumstances.
149 CONG. REC. S5113-01, 5116 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy).
216
Letter from the United States Sentencing Commission to Senators Hatch
and Leahy 1 (Apr. 2, 2003), at http://www.nacdl.org/departures. The Sentencing
Commission stated:
We, the voting members of the United States Sentencing Commission,
join in expressing our concerns over the amendment entitled,
“Sentencing Reform” recently attached to Child Abduction Prevention
Act of 2003, H.R. 1104, 108th Cong. 2003 . . . . In the past, with an
issue of such magnitude, Congress has directed that the Commission
conduct a review and analysis which would be incorporated in a report
back to Congress. The Commission is uniquely qualified to serve
Congress by conducting such studies due to its ability to analyze its
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the increasing rate of departures from the Guidelines but requested
that Congress allow the Commission to perform its statutory
purpose of reviewing departures and recommending changes
where appropriate.217 The Sentencing Commission also explained,
however, that “[t]he Commission adopted the departure policy not
only to carry out congressional intent but also in recognition of the
limits of adopting a perfect guideline system that would address all
human conduct that might be relevant to a sentencing decision.”218
The American Bar Association expressed concern that the Feeney
Amendment “would all but eliminate the discretionary power of
federal judges to achieve justice in individual cases, and effectively
transform the Sentencing Guidelines into a system of mandatory
minimum sentences.”219 Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
expressing the view of the Judicial Conference of the United
States, wrote that “this legislation, if enacted, would do serious
harm to the basic structure of the sentencing guideline system and
would seriously impair the ability of courts to impose just and
reasonable sentences.”220 The Federal Judges Association
explained that “[t]his amendment undermines the essential
vast database, obtain the views and comments of various segments of
the federal criminal justice community, review the academic literature,
and report back to Congress in a timely manner. Indeed, such a process
is contemplated by the original legislation which established the
Commission over 15 years ago. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o).
Id.
217

Id. The Sentencing Commission stated that it was undertaking an
extensive review of all non-substantial assistance departures. Id. The
Commission noted that there are a number of factors requiring examination
before drawing conclusions about non-substantial assistance departure rates. Id.
218
Id.
219
Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President of the American Bar
Association to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, 1 (Apr. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/departures. The letter stated that if the Feeney Amendment
was adopted “all these dramatic changes would be accomplished through a
House floor amendment to an unrelated bill, adopted without committee
hearings by either the House or the Senate, or the benefit of consultation with
the U.S. Sentencing Commission, the federal judiciary, or the organized Bar.”
Id.
220
Letter from Chief Justice William Rehnquist to Senator Patrick Leahy 2
(Apr. 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/departures.
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attribute of judging, which is to apply the law to the specific case
by making an informed and dispassionate judgment.”221
C. The Final Version of the Feeney Amendment Passed by
Congress
As a result of these types of concerns, the departure provisions
of the original Feeney Amendment were modified by an
amendment introduced by Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT), Lindsey
Graham (R-SC), and Rep. Jim Sensenbrenner (R-WI), known as
the Hatch-Sensenbrenner-Graham amendment.222 The final version
of the amendment, however, retained many aspects of the original
Feeney Amendment.223 The de novo appellate review standard
would apply in all downward departure cases.224 The final version
retained the requirement that the Chief Judge of each district court
submit a report to the Sentencing Commission within 30 days
following entry of judgment in every criminal case.225
221

Letter from the Federal Judges Association to Senator Orrin G. Hatch 1
(Apr. 3, 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.org/departures. The Federal
Judges Association also stated that “the Feeney Amendment eviscerates fifteen
years of judicial practice following the Sentencing Reform Act as well as the
cooperative efforts of Congress, the Executive Branch, and the Judiciary to
bring about a more just sentencing system.” Id. at 2.
222
149 CONG. REC. H3059-02, 3062 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of
Rep. Feeney).
223
See Mark H. Allenbaugh, Who’s Afraid of the Federal Judiciary: Why
Congress’ Fear of Judicial Sentencing Discretion May Undermine a Generation
of Reform, 27 CHAMPION 6, 12 (June 2003). Senator Leahy noted that “[d]espite
such objections, and without any serious process in the House or Senate, these
provisions were pushed through conference with minor changes and enacted.”
149 CONG. REC. S9115-02, 9115 (daily ed. July 9, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
224
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2004) (stating that “the court of appeals shall
review de novo the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts).
225
PROTECT Act, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(h)(1)(a)-(f), 117 Stat. 650,
672 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1)). The PROTECT Act directs:
The Chief Judge of each district court shall ensure that, within 30 days
following entry of judgment in every criminal case, the sentencing
court submits to the Commission a written report of the sentence, the
offense for which it is imposed, the age, race, sex of the offender, and
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Additionally, this version retained the requirement that the
Attorney General send a report, including the identity of the judge,
to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
and the Senate not later than fifteen days after a district court’s
grant of a downward departure in any case other than a case
involving a downward departure for substantial assistance.226
Procedurally, the final version requires judges to describe with
specificity in writing all upward and downward departures.227
information regarding factors made relevant by the guidelines. The
report shall also include—(A) the judgment and commitment order; (B)
the statement of reasons for the sentence imposed (which shall include
the reason for any departure from the otherwise applicable guideline
range); (C) any plea agreement; (D) the indictment or other charging
document; (E) the presentence report; and (F) any other information as
the Commission finds appropriate.
Id.
226

Id. at § 401(l)(2)(A)-(B) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (note)). The
PROTECT Act directs:
Not later than 15 days after a district court’s grant of a downward
departure in any case, other than a case involving a downward
departure for substantial assistance to authorities . . . the Attorney
General shall submit a report to the Committees on the Judiciary of the
House of Representatives and the Senate containing the information
described under subparagraph (B). (B) Contents—The report submitted
pursuant to subparagraph (A) shall set forth—(i) the case; (ii) the facts
involved; (iii) the identity of the district court judge; (iv) the district
court’s stated reasons, whether or not the court provided the United
States with advance notice of its intention to depart; and (v) the
position of the parties with respect to the downward departure, whether
or not the United States has filed, or intends to file, a motion for
reconsideration.
Id.
227
Id. at § 401(c) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)). The law requires:
The court, at the time of sentencing, shall state in open court the
reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence, and, if the
sentence . . . . is not of the kind, or is outside the range, described in
[the Guidelines] the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence
different from that described, which reasons must also be stated with
specificity in the written order of judgment and commitment . . . .
Id. Previously the sentencing judge could orally state the reasons for a departure.
VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1324.
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Substantively, it only restricts downward departures in cases
involving child crimes and sexual offenses.228 The new amendment
limits the composition of the Sentencing Commission to “not more
than three” federal judges instead of “at least three.”229 This
provision was added during the Conference Committee’s one
meeting on the AMBER Alert bill.230 Finally, it requires the
Sentencing Commission to issue appropriate amendments to the
guidelines to ensure that the incidence of downward departures is
substantially reduced within 180 days of enactment of the Act. 231
Congress agreed to this version and it became effective on April
30, 2003.232
228

PROTECT Act § 401(b) codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)). Senator
Leahy noted:
Rather than directly address important measures to protect our children,
the AMBER Alert conference committee effectively rewrote the
criminal code on the back of an envelope. First, the final language
established one set of sentencing rules for child pornographers and a
more flexible set of sentencing rules for other Federal defendants,
including terrorists, murderers, mobsters, civil rights violators, and
white collar criminals. No one here believes that sex offenders deserve
anything less than harsh sentences, but I cannot understand why we
would treat the terrorists better.
149 CONG. REC. S6708-01 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
229
PROTECT Act § 401(n)(1) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)).
230
149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6713 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of
Rep. Leahy) (explaining that the provision reducing the number of members on
the Commission was introduced during the Conference Committee meeting).
231
PROTECT Act § 401(m)(1)(A). The Sentencing Commission complied
with this requirement by amending the Sentencing Guidelines to substantially
reduce the incidences of downward departures. See Report to the Congress:
Downward Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (October 2003),
submitted in response to section 401(m) of the PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-21, available at http://www.nacdl.org/departures.
232
VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1322. S. 151 incorporated H.R. 1104.
House Overwhelmingly Approves Conference Report on Child Protection Legisl
ation, supra note 173. S. 151, however, modified the controversial “two strikes
you’re out” provision. 149 CONG. REC. S5137-01, 5146 (daily ed. Apr. 10,
2003) (statement by Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy stated that “[a]mong other
things, the conference clarified that the ‘two strikes’ law would not apply to a
defendant whose only prior sex conviction was a misdemeanor under state law.
The conference also provided a limited affirmative defense for defendants
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IV. THE FEENEY AMENDMENT RAISES CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES
AND INTRUDES INTO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The intervention of several interested groups preserved the
ability of judges to depart except in situations involving sexual
offenses against children.233 The Feeney Amendment, however,
impacts the judicial exercise of discretion and downward
departures in less direct methods by limiting the number of judges
who can serve on the Sentencing Commission, establishing judge
specific reporting requirements, and overturning the deferential
standard of review for departures from the Guidelines.234 These
provisions represent a general effort to limit judicial discretion
because of the perception by the DOJ and certain members of
Congress that judges have been too lenient.235
A. Limiting the Composition of the Sentencing Commission to
“Not More than Three” Federal Judges
The Feeney Amendment threatens to quiet the voice of the
judiciary by limiting the composition of the Sentencing
Commission to “not more than three” federal judges.236 The SRA
located the Commission in the Judicial Branch and, as originally
enacted, required that the membership of the Commission
comprise “at least three” federal judges.237 As there are seven
convicted under certain Federal statutes that have less culpable applications.” Id.
233
See supra text accompanying notes 214-21.
234
See generally 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2004); 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2004); 18
U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2004); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996).
235
Laurie L. Levenson, The War on Sex Abuse, NAT’L L. J., June 2, 2002,
at col. 4.
236
28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2004).
237
28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2001). See supra Part II.B. It has been noted that:
[Despite] the extraordinarily limited role that the 1984 bill left for the
judiciary in appointing commissioners and developing the sentencing
guidelines, the measure still proclaimed that the Commission would be
an “independent commission in the judicial branch” . . . . The primary
reason for this obfuscation was apparent: supporters were fearful that
the Supreme Court might hold the Sentencing Commission
unconstitutional unless it were considered part of the judicial, rather
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voting members on the Commission, the Feeney Amendment
changes the composition of the Commission so that there will
never be a majority of federal judges contributing to the
development of principled guidelines.238 The Feeney Amendment
reduces the input of the judiciary, which is uniquely placed to
consider sentencing issues, in the promulgation of the Guidelines
and transfers increased power to Congress and the Executive in the
sentencing system.239
than the executive, branch of government. Moreover, the insistence that
the Sentencing Commission was part of the “judicial branch” made the
proposed reforms appear less radical than they were.
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 45. (footnotes omitted).
238
28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2004).
239
United States v. Mellert, No. CR-03-0043 MHP, 2003 WL 22025007, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. July 30, 2003). Chief U.S. District Judge Marilyn Patel of the
Northern District of California noted in a recent case that:
This piece of legislation would add not only more mandatory
minimums, but also insinuate Congress even further into the process of
actually drafting and promulgating Sentencing Guidelines, thus taking
over the role of the Sentencing Commission as well as the judiciary’s
traditional role of sentencing. Indeed, [the PROTECT Act changes] the
composition of the Sentencing Commission to delete the requirement
that “at least three” of the members of the Commission be “Federal
judges” to “not more than three”, further diluting the judiciary’s input
and decision making with respect to the guidelines . . . . The thrust of
the legislation is to remove more and more of the determination and
discretion in sentencing from an independent judiciary and the
Commission and vest it in the Department of Justice, which, of course,
is a partisan in our system of justice.
Id. at *1-2. Senator Leahy, a co-sponsor of the PROTECT Act, explained:
The Hatch-Sensenbrenner amendment not only maintains the worst
aspects of the controversial Feeney Amendment-provisions that have
nothing to do with child protection-but also adds in new provisions that
were not in the original Feeney Amendment. For example, it limits the
number of Federal judges who can serve on the Sentencing
Commission because, as Chairman Sensenbrenner explained, “we don’t
want to have the Commission packed with Federal judges that have a
genetic predisposition to hate any kind of sentencing guidelines.” I, for
one, believe that judges are extremely valuable members of the
Commission. They bring years of highly relevant experience, not to
mention reasoned judgment, to the table. The Republicans apparently
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The framers of the Constitution declined to assign the
responsibility of federal sentencing to any one of the three
branches.240 The sentencing system has always involved the
participation of each branch of government.241 This sharing of
responsibility is in accord with separation of power principles. The
Supreme Court has observed that “[w]hile the Constitution diffuses
power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice
will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity.”242 The sentencing process reflects this
integration of dispersed powers by affording Congress the power
to set sentencing ranges and determine the scope of judicial
discretion,243 the Executive the power to prosecute crimes,244 and
the Judiciary the power to determine sentences and exercise
discretion within the framework established by Congress.245
believe that their knowledge is of limited value. I find it ironic that the
Republicans, in forcing through this measure, will undercut one of the
signature achievements of Ronald Reagan’s Presidency-a firm, tough,
fair system of sentencing in the Federal criminal justice system.
149 CONG. REC. S5137-01, 5146 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Sen.
Leahy).
240
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364. The Supreme Court observed that
“[h]istorically, federal sentencing—the function of determining the scope and
extent of punishment—never has been thought to be assigned by the
Constitution to the exclusive jurisdiction of any one of the three Branches of
Government.” Id.
241
Id. The Supreme Court has noted that “under the indeterminate-sentence
system, Congress defined the maximum, the judge imposed a sentence within
the statutory range (which he usually could replace with probation), and the
Executive Branch’s parole official eventually determined the actual duration of
imprisonment.” Id. at 365
242
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 636 (1952).
243
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364.
244
I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 1002 (1983). Additionally, the President
has the power to grant “reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United
States.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
245
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 391. The Supreme Court noted the “consistent
responsibility of federal judges to pronounce sentence within the statutory range
established by Congress . . . .” Id. The Supreme Court also observed that the
“Guidelines bind judges in their uncontested responsibility to pass sentence in
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Although Congress has the power to establish sentencing
ranges, judicial contribution to the promulgation of the Guidelines
is essential because of the political nature of criminal
sentencing.246 The public’s perspective on crime is influenced by
the media, and Congress reacts to public concerns by toughening
criminal sentences.247 The danger of placing complete control over
the development of the Guidelines in the hands of Congress is that
members of Congress may be influenced by the need to appear
“tough on crime” for reelection purposes rather than engage in a
meaningful analysis of whether current sentencing practices are
fair.248 Indeed, the evidence suggests that the sentencing system,
criminal cases.” Id.
246
Strauss, supra note 21, at 1591-92. One commentator observed that
“[s]ince the politicization of crime . . . in the 1960s, politicians’ fear of being
labeled ‘soft on crime’ has led to a constant ratcheting-up of punitiveness.” Id.
247
Hofer & Allenbaugh, supra note 19, at 28. Two commentators noted:
[M]any guideline amendments are not initiated by the Commission
based on research identifying flaws in the existing rules. The
Guidelines are often amended because Congress directs the
Commission to increase sentences for a particular type of crime, often a
crime that has received media attention. For example, in 2000,
Congress directed the Commission to increase penalties for trafficking
in the “club drug” MDMA, commonly known as “ecstasy.” The
Commission responded with an amendment doubling, and in some
cases tripling, penalties.
Id. Judge John S. Martin, Jr., of the Southern District of New York, noted that
“Congress has tried to micromanage the work of the commission and has
undermined its efforts to provide judges with some discretion in sentencing or to
ameliorate excessively harsh terms.” John S. Martin, Jr., Let Judges Do Their
Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2003, at A31.
248
Developments in the Law–Alternative Punishments: Resistance and
Inroads, supra note 18, at 1967. One commentator noted:
Few social problems receive more political attention than crime. When
national crime rates soar, as they did from the 1960s through the early
1990s, politicians respond to the public fear of violent crime by
attacking the failure of government to accomplish its most basic
purpose—the protection of its citizens. In our political culture, what are
sometimes contemptuously referred to as “lock ‘em up” arguments
resonate deeply with the electorate. Concerns about the costeffectiveness of incarceration raised in the pages of scholarly journals
and books, and other technical arguments, do not translate into
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driven by mandatory minimums and the Guidelines, is leading to
distortions of the fairness and equality originally intended by the
Guidelines because these measures have resulted in a disparate
impact on minorities.249 Additionally, America’s prison population
has dramatically increased since the enactment of the Guidelines
and the implementation of mandatory minimums.250 The
constitutional guarantees of lifetime tenure and protection against
salary diminishment enhance judicial impartiality and afford
effective campaign speeches. The public is fed up with crime and
frustrated with theory and speculation that fail to produce the result
they care about—safer streets.
Id.
249

Dan Rodricks, Given Failed War on Drugs, Lewis Charges No Surprise,
BALT. SUN, Mar. 4, 2004, at 1B. One commentator noted that “[t]he Sentencing
Project in Washington reports that in 1980, the year Ronald Reagan was elected
to his first term as president, there were 40,000 Americans in prison solely for
drug offenses. By last year, that number had grown to 450,000, and 75 percent
of them were black or Hispanic.” Id. Another critic observed:
The number of African-American men in college is less than the
number of those under supervision of the courts . . . . [The war on
drugs] has seen the rate of imprisonment of drug offenders jump by 700
percent since 1980; a war that depends on narrowly targeted law
enforcement and on mandatory prison sentences . . . . The war on drugs
has been disproportionately a war on young black men.
James Carroll, American ‘Values’ Cast a Global Shadow, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
30, 2003, at A15. Justice Anthony Kennedy recently reflected on the state of the
nation’s prisons when he explained that “[w]ere we to enter the hidden world of
punishment, we should be startled by what we see. Consider its remarkable
scale. The nationwide inmate population today is about 2.1 million people . . . .
We should revisit this compromise. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines should
be revised downward.” Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar
Association
Annual
Meeting
(Aug.
9,
2003),
available
at
http://www.nacdl.org/departures.
250
Rodricks, supra note 249, at 1B. One commentator noted that “[i]t took
about 150 years for the American prison population to reach 500,000 inmates,
and that occurred in 1980. Since then, the American penal nation has grown by
1.6 million.” Id. Another critic observed that the “American prison population
recently went over 2 million for the first time, putting the United States ahead of
Russia as the world capital of incarceration . . . . Thirty years ago, one in 1,000
Americans was locked up; today, almost five are.” Carroll, supra note 249, at
A15.
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judges greater protection against the same political and public
pressures exerted on Congress.251 Federal judges uniquely
contribute to the work of the Commission because of their greater
impartiality and expertise in criminal sentencing.252
Furthermore, the Supreme Court affirmed the necessity of the
judicial role in sentencing when it upheld the constitutionality of
the Sentencing Commission in Mistretta v. United States.253 The
Petitioner argued that the participation of federal judges in the
making of policy threatens the impartiality and non-partisanship of
the Judicial Branch.254 The Supreme Court held that, although it “is
a judgment that is not without difficulty,” the inclusion of federal
judges on the Sentencing Commission does not threaten the
impartiality of the judiciary because of one “paramount
consideration,” the judicial function of criminal sentencing.255 The
Court observed that “the Sentencing Commission is devoted
251

Gerald E. Rosen & Kyle W. Harding, Reflections Upon Judicial
Independence as We Approach the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison:
Safeguarding the Constitution’s “Crown Jewel”, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 791,
797 (2002) (noting that “[b]y insulating judges from political and public
pressure, judicial independence affords courts the freedom to decide cases based
on the law.”).
252
149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6713 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy stated that “I, for one, believe that judges are
extremely valuable members of the Commission. They bring years of highly
relevant experience, not to mention reasoned judgment, to the table. The
Republicans apparently believe that their expertise is of limited value.” Id.
253
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 390-91.
254
Id. at 397. The Court noted:
We are somewhat more troubled by petitioner’s argument that the
Judiciary’s entanglement in the political work of the Commission
undermines public confidence in the disinterestedness of the Judicial
Branch. While the problem of individual bias is usually cured through
recusal, no such mechanism can overcome the appearance of
institutional partiality that may arise from judiciary involvement in the
making of policy. The legitimacy of the Judicial Branch ultimately
depends on its reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship. That
reputation may not be borrowed by the political Branches to cloak their
work in the neutral colors of judicial action.
Id. at 407.
255
Id.
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exclusively to the development of rules to rationalize a process that
has been and will continue to be performed exclusively by the
Judicial Branch. In our view, this is essentially a neutral endeavor
and one in which judicial participation is peculiarly
appropriate.”256 Indeed, the Senate Report on the SRA approved
the primacy of the relationship between federal sentencing and the
judiciary: “Placement of the commission in the judicial branch is
based upon the committee’s strong feeling that even under this
legislation, sentencing should remain primarily a judicial
function.”257 Thus, the Court observed that Congress had simply
recognized the role of the judiciary in criminal sentencing.258
Additionally, the Court stated that “judicial participation on the
Commission ensures that judicial experience and expertise will
inform the promulgation of rules for the exercise of the Judicial
Branch’s own business—that of passing sentence on every
criminal defendant.”259 Reducing the input of the judiciary to “not
more than three” federal judges undermines the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in Mistretta that the Sentencing Commission should
properly be located in the Judicial Branch.
Moreover, the requirement that “not more than three” federal
judges sit on the Commission implies that the Commission does
not have to contain any federal judges.260 Yet the opinion in
Mistretta raises doubts about the constitutionality of the
Commission if it is located in the Executive or Legislative
Branches. One of the theories used by the Supreme Court in
Mistretta to uphold the constitutionality of the SRA was that the
256

Id.
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 159 (1983).
258
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 396-97. The Court noted:
In sum, since substantive judgment in the field of sentencing has been
and remains appropriate to the Judicial Branch, and the methodology of
rulemaking has been and remains appropriate to that Branch, Congress’
considered decision to combine these functions in an independent
Sentencing Commission and to locate that Commission within the
Judicial Branch does not violate the principle of separation of powers.
257

Id.
259
260

Id. at 408.
Vinegrad, supra note 86.
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Sentencing Commission was properly located in the Judicial
Branch because the judiciary is uniquely placed to consider
sentencing issues:
The Constitution’s structural protections do not prohibit
Congress from delegating to an expert body located within
the Judicial Branch the intricate task of formulating
sentencing guidelines consistent with such significant
statutory direction as is present here. Nor does our system
of checked and balanced authority prohibit Congress from
calling upon the accumulated wisdom and experience of the
Judicial Branch in creating policy on a matter uniquely
within the ken of judges. Accordingly, we hold that the Act
is constitutional.261
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Mistretta entertained the
hypothetical of a decision by Congress to place the task of creating
sentencing guidelines within the Executive Branch: “[H]ad
Congress decided to confer responsibility for promulgating
sentencing guidelines on the Executive Branch, we might face the
constitutional questions whether Congress unconstitutionally had
assigned judicial responsibilities to the Executive or
unconstitutionally had united the power to prosecute and the power
to sentence within one Branch.”262 Reducing the composition of
the Commission to a minority or no federal judges raises the
question whether the Sentencing Commission is properly
characterized as an agency within the Judicial Branch.263
As the Court articulated in Mistretta, placement of the
Commission in the Executive Branch raises separation of powers
261

Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 412.
Id. at 391 n.17. The Court quoted Ronald L. Gainer, former Associate
Deputy Attorney-General at the U.S. Department of Justice, where he
supervised the Department’s fifteen-year effort to develop a new Federal
Criminal Code, who testified in 1977 before the Subcommittee on Criminal
Laws and Procedure of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary of the 95th
Congress that “[i]f guidelines were to be promulgated by an agency outside the
judicial branch, it might be viewed as an encroachment on a judicial
function . . . .” Id.
263
Id. at 385-97. The Court emphasized that the Commission is an
“independent” body, including at least three federal judges. Id. at 385.
262
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issues because the Executive’s power to prosecute criminals and
execute the laws would be linked with the power to create
sentencing law.264 Indeed, Congress also recognized when it
created the Commission that placing the Commission in the
Executive Branch would inappropriately unite the power to
prosecute with the power to set criminal sentences:
Traditionally, the courts and Congress have shared
responsibility for establishing Federal sentencing policy.
Congress defines criminal conduct and sets maximum
sentences, while the courts impose sentences in individual
cases. Any suggestion that the Executive Branch should be
responsible for promulgating the guidelines would present
troubling constitutional problems. More importantly, it
would fundamentally alter the relationship of the Congress
and the Judiciary with respect to sentencing policy and its
implementation. Giving such significant control over the
determination of sentences to the same branch of
government that is responsible for the prosecution of
criminal cases is no more appropriate than granting such
power to a consortium of defense attorneys.
If the power of the Executive Branch to prosecute criminal
violations were joined with the power to prescribe
sentences for those convicted, it would constitute a
potential for tyranny. These powers should not be lodged in
the prosecuting branch any more than in a “consortium of
defense attorneys.”265
Not only does the Executive exercise the power to prosecute, but it
also wields some control over the composition of the Commission
in the President’s sole authority to appoint and remove the
Commission’s members.266 Diluting judicial input in the work of
264

Id. at 391 n.17. In addition, the Court noted that “[i]n the field of
sentencing, the Executive Branch never has exercised the kind of authority that
Congress has vested in the Commission.” Id. at 387 n.14.
265
U.S. v. Roy, 694 F. Supp. 635, 639 (D. Minn. 1988) (quoting House
Report to Sentencing Revision Act of 1984, H.R. Res. 6012, H.R. Rep. No. 981017, 98th Cong.2d Sess., Sept. 13, 1984 at 94-95) (citations omitted).
266
28 U.S.C. § 991(a) (2004). The President appoints the seven voting
members of the Commission by and with advice and consent of the Senate. Id.
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the Commission improperly concentrates power over the
sentencing process in the Executive because of its already
considerable authority to prosecute criminals and influence the
composition of the Commission.
Judicial involvement in the work of the Commission provides a
safeguard against “transient political considerations.”267 If the
Commission were to develop the Guidelines without the input of
federal judges, then the function of the Commission to create
sentencing law suggests that the Commission is a legislative body
and should be subject to the legislative safeguards of bicameralism
and presentment.268 In upholding the constitutionality of Congress’
The federal judges are chosen from a list of six judges recommended to the
President by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Id. The members of
the Commission are subject to removal only for neglect of duty or malfeasance
in office or for other good cause shown. Id.
267
Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President of the American Bar
Association to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, (Apr. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/departures. The President of the American Bar
Association wrote:
By overriding the Sentencing Commission and legislatively rewriting
the Guidelines, the Feeney Amendment threatens the legitimacy of the
Commission. The Commission was created by Congress to ensure that
important decisions about federal sentencing were made intelligently,
dispassionately, and, so far as possible, uninfluenced by transient
political considerations. Congress should accord the Commission and
its processes some deference unless and until the Commission has
demonstrably failed in its duties.
Id.
268
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 413. Justice Scalia wrote in his sole dissenting
opinion in Mistretta that locating the Commission in the Judicial Branch was
unconstitutional because the Guidelines “have the force and effect of laws,
prescribing the sentences criminal defendants are to receive.” Id. The
Constitution dictates that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to
the President of the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. With regard
to the Presentment Clause, the Supreme Court has noted that the “President’s
role in the lawmaking process also reflects the Framers’ careful efforts to check
whatever propensity a particular Congress might have to enact oppressive,
improvident, or ill-considered measures.” I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 94748 (1983). In the context of bicameralism, the Supreme Court has observed that
“[b]y providing that no law could take effect without the concurrence of the
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delegation of rulemaking power to the Commission, the majority
opinion in Mistretta noted that delegation of rulemaking power
“pursuant to a legislative delegation is not the exclusive
prerogative of the Executive.”269 The majority opinion further
noted that when “we characterized rulemaking as ‘Executive
action’ not governed by the Presentment Clauses, we did so as part
of our effort to distinguish the rulemaking of administrative
agencies from ‘lawmaking’ by Congress which is subject to the
presentment requirements of Article I.”270 By analogy, rulemaking
authority delegated to agencies in the Judicial Branch is not subject
to presentment and bicameralism requirements as reflected in the
procedure for passing the Guidelines under the SRA.271 If the
Commission, however, is “a sort of junior-varsity Congress,” as
suggested by Justice Scalia in his dissenting opinion in Mistretta,
then the promulgation of guidelines should receive the same
legislative safeguards as other laws.272
prescribed majority of the Members of both Houses, the Framers reemphasized
their belief . . . that legislation should not be enacted unless it has been carefully
and fully considered by the Nation’s elected officials.” Id. at 948-49.
269
Id. at 387 n.14. See I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
270
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 387 n. 14. See Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
271
28 U.S.C. § 994(a) (2004). SRA directs:
The Commission, by affirmative vote of at least four members of the
Commission, and pursuant to its rules and regulations and consistent
with all pertinent provisions of any Federal statute shall promulgate and
distribute to all courts of the United States and to the United States
Probation System—(1) guidelines, as described in this section, for use
of a sentencing court in determining the sentence to be imposed in a
criminal case . . . .
Id.
272
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 427. Justice Scalia supported the majority’s
opinion with regard to the petitioner’s delegation argument that “the doctrine of
unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority has been violated because of
the lack of intelligible, congressionally prescribed standards to guide the
Commission.” Id. at 416. He disagreed with the majority, however, because “the
power to make law cannot be exercised by anyone other than Congress, except
in conjunction with the lawful exercise of executive or judicial power.” Id. at
417. Executive and judicial powers are not lawfully exercised by the
Commission because “[t]he lawmaking function of the Commission is
completely divorced from any responsibility for execution of the law or
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B. Reporting Requirements and Data Collection Provisions
Interfere with Judicial Independence
The reporting provisions of the PROTECT Act challenge the
premise of judicial independence by establishing Executive and
Legislative monitoring of the traditional judicial function of
sentencing.273 The independence of the federal judiciary is a
cornerstone of governmental structure and a fundamental
component of separation of powers.274 Although the SRA limited
adjudication of private rights under the law.” Id. at 420.
273
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, 2003 Year-End Report on the
Federal Judiciary (Jan. 1, 2004), available at http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/publicinfo/year-end/2003year-endreport.html. Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained that the “subject matter of the questions Congress may pose about
judges’ decisions, and whether they target the judicial decisions of individual
federal judges, could appear to be an unwarranted and ill-considered effort to
intimidate individual judges in the performance of their judicial duties.” Id.
274
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 406 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W.
Carey & James McClellan eds., 2001). Alexander Hamilton recognized that the
independence of the judiciary “guard[s] the constitution and the rights of
individuals from the effects of those ill humours which the arts of designing
men . . . sometimes disseminate among the people themselves . . . .” Id. at 405.
He also observed the importance of the judiciary to the proper maintenance of
separation of powers:
Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is of vast importance
in mitigating the severity and confining the operation of [unjust and
partial] laws. It not only serves to moderate the immediate mischiefs of
those which may have been passed, but it operates as a check upon the
legislative body in passing them . . . .
Id. at 406. Hamilton also observed the weakness of the judiciary with regard to
the legislative and executive branches. Id. at 402. He noted that the judiciary
“has no influence over either the sword or the purse . . . [and] may truly be said
to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.” Id. He noted the
“natural feebleness of the judiciary,” and its “continual jeopardy of being
overpowered, awed or influenced by its coordinate branches . . . .” Id. at 403. In
recognition of this potential, the Constitution provides the judiciary with lifetime
appointments, protection against salary diminishments while in office, and
removal only by impeachment for violating the constitutional “good behavior”
standard. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Chief Justice William Rehnquist explained:
One of the critical challenges of American government is to preserve
the legitimate independence of the judicial function while recognizing
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the ability of judges to exercise discretion, it preserved the ability
of judges to engage in individualized assessment of cases to the
extent permitted by the departure provisions.275 The Feeney
Amendment undermines judicial independence and provides a
framework for intimidation of judges by requiring the Sentencing
Commission to make available to the House and Senate
Committees on the Judiciary, upon request, the written reports and
all underlying records accompanying the reports, that the Chief
Judge of each district court is required to submit in every criminal
case to the Sentencing Commission.276 Additionally, the Feeney
Amendment requires that the Sentencing Commission make
available to the Attorney General, upon request, the data files that
the Commission maintains based on the information provided by
the Chief Judge, including the identity of the sentencing judge.277
The data files contain, among other things, the judgment, statement
the role Congress must play in determining how the judiciary functions.
Article III of the Constitution grants to Article III judges two
significant protections of their independence: they have tenure during
good behavior, and their compensation may not be diminished during
their term of office. But federal judges are heavily dependent upon
Congress for virtually every other aspect of their being—including
when and whether to increase judicial compensation.
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Address at the Federal Judges Association
Board of Directors Meeting (May 5, 2003), available at http://www.supreme
courtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_05-05-03.html (last visited Feb. 2, 2004).
275
149 CONG. REC. S5113-01, 5116 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy noted:
As one of the authors of the Sentencing Reform Act, I can say that
Congress did not intend to eliminate judicial discretion. We recognized
that the circumstances that may warrant departure from the guideline
range cannot, by their very nature, be comprehensively listed or
analyzed in advance. In interpreting the Act, both the Supreme Court
and the Sentencing Commission have emphasized this point. This is not
a partisan position. Judicial authority to exercise discretion when
imposing a sentence was and is an integral part of the structure of the
Federal sentencing guidelines and indeed of every guideline system in
use today.
Id.
276
28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(2) (2004).
277
Id. at § 994(w)(4).
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of reasons for the sentence imposed, any plea agreement, the
presentence report, and any other information which the
Commission finds appropriate.278 These reporting requirements
hinder the traditional judicial function of sentencing by creating a
tool for congressional and executive intimidation of judges who
grant downward departures.279
The reporting provisions of the Feeney Amendment are
unnecessary because the Commission, located in the Judicial
Branch, compiles sentencing information pursuant to its statutory
mandate to periodically review and revise the Guidelines and
report any amendments to Congress.280 Indeed, the Sentencing
Commission is required to submit to Congress at least annually an
analysis of the reports submitted by the Chief Judge of each district
court and an accounting of those districts that the Commission
considers have not complied with the reporting requirements.281
The reporting provisions of the PROTECT Act, however, subject
the decisions and identity of individual judges to full disclosure
and review by the Executive and Congress even though the
Sentencing Commission is already required to analyze and submit
information on departure decisions.282
278

Id. at § 994(w)(1).
149 CONG. REC. S5113-01, 5119 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy noted:
I must express my deep concern for the provision of the legislation that
requires the Commission to report to the Judiciary Committees of the
Congress and even to the Attorney General confidential court records
and even “the identity of the sentencing judge.” I do not believe that
this provision serves any legitimate interests of the Congress. I do not
believe that authorizing disclosure of this information to the executive
branch is warranted. I have deep concerns that this provision lacks the
respect owed by the Congress to a co-equal branch.
Id. (emphasis added).
280
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(o)-(p) (2004).
281
Id. at § 994(w)(3). “The Commission shall submit to Congress at least
annually an analysis of these documents, any recommendations for legislation
that the Commission concludes is warranted by that analysis, and an accounting
of those districts that the Commission believes have not submitted the
appropriate information and documents required by this section.” Id.
282
See 28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1)-(4) (2004). Leonidas Ralph Mecham,
279
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One of the most troubling examples of the possible
consequences of the reporting requirements was shown in the
actions taken against Chief Judge James M. Rosenbaum of the
United States District Court for the District of Minnesota after his
testimony concerning a proposed amendment to the Guidelines.283
In May 2001, the Sentencing Commission unanimously submitted
to Congress a proposal to limit to a maximum of ten years the
sentence defendants could receive who played a minor role in a
drug operation.284 The amendment sought to resolve the problem
that minor offenders carrying small amounts of drugs were
receiving harsher sentences than supervisors in the drug trade since
drug quantity is the determining factor in sentencing.285 In
response to the proposed amendment, Representative Lamar Smith
(R-TX) introduced H.R. 4689, for himself and among others,
Representative Sensenbrenner, to block the Commission’s
recommendation.286
On May 14, 2002, the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Secretary of the Judicial Conference of the United States wrote:
Among other things, this data [provided by the Sentencing
Commission] provides for each court the percentage of defendants who
receive substantial assistance departures and the percentage of
defendants who receive other downward departures. We urge Congress
to meet its responsibility to oversee the functioning of the criminal
justice system through use of this and other information without
subjecting individual judges to the risk of unfair criticism in isolated
cases where the record may not fully reflect the events leading up to
and informing the judge’s decision in a particular case.
Letter from Leonidas Ralph Mecham, Secretary of the Judicial Conference of
the United States, to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, (Apr. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/departures.
283
Douglas A. Kelley, Federal Judge Draws Congressional Ire, 60 BENCH
& B. OF MINN. 22, 23-25 (2003) (describing House Republican’s response to
Chief Judge Rosenbaum’s testimony).
284
Tony Mauro, Judiciary Committee to Debate Disparity in Drug
Sentences, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, May 21, 2002, at 4. See H.R. REP. NO.
107-769, at 6-7 (2002) for a description of the amendment.
285
Mauro, supra note 284, at 4. In one year, for example, couriers and
mules were held accountable for almost as much powder cocaine (4,900 grams)
as managers and supervisors (5,000 grams). H.R. REP. NO. 107-769, at 9 (2002).
286
H.R. 4689, 107th Cong. (2002).
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Homeland Security held a legislative hearing on H.R. 4689.287
Judge Rosenbaum testified in support of the Commission’s
amendment because it would contribute to the development of a
more equitable system with respect to low-level drug offenders.288
Judge Rosenbaum has a reputation for being a tough sentencing
judge.289 He testified that the “present sentencing system sentences
minor and minimal participants who do a day’s work, in an
admittedly evil enterprise, the same way it sentences the planner
and enterprise-operator who set the evil plan in motion and who
figures to take its profits.”290 Before the Committee, he gave
examples of actual cases involving low-level offenders where
application of the Commission’s amendment would result in a
more just outcome.291
Following the hearing, the House Judiciary Committee
requested from Judge Rosenbaum downward departure
information in the cases he discussed in his testimony.292 Judge
Rosenbaum supplied information which reflected that he had
granted downward departures in certain cases but did not include
the reasons for the departures.293 Judge Rosenbaum declined to
provide further information following subsequent requests for
departure information and suggested that the Committee order
transcripts of the sentencing proceedings.294 The Committee did
so.295 Based on the transcripts, the Committee charged that Judge
Rosenbaum misrepresented the sentences imposed in the example
cases because he had departed below the guideline range, belying
287

H.R. REP. NO. 107-769, at 7 (2002).
Id. at 9.
289
Kelley, supra note 283, at 22. Judge Rosenbaum was nominated by
conservative Senator Rudy Boschwitz and appointed by President Ronald
Reagan. Id. Additionally, his sentences for drug offenders exceeded the national
median each year between 1998 and 2002. Id.
290
H.R. REP. NO. 107-769, at 9-10 (2002).
291
Kelley, supra note 283, at 22. Rosenbaum discussed several recent cases
in the District of Minnesota. H.R. REP. 107-769, at 10 (2002).
292
H.R. REP. NO. 107-769, at 10 (2002).
293
Id.
294
Id. at 11.
295
Id.
288
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his testimony that the Commission’s amendment was necessary to
mitigate unwarranted sentencing harshness.296 Within a week, the
House Judiciary Committee, of which Representative
Sensenbrenner is Chairman, accused Rosenbaum of misleading the
Committee about his examples and demanded all of his documents
because of his “record of hostility” to the Guidelines.297 Judge
Rosenbaum refused, however, and the House Judiciary Committee
threatened him with a subpoena.298 In February of 2003, the
Judiciary Committee attempted to obtain Judge Rosenbaum’s
records from the General Accounting Office (GAO), but was
unsuccessful because the GAO does not investigate individual
judges.299 The Committee did not rule out impeachment as a
course of action against Judge Rosenbaum.300
Chief Justice William Rehnquist revealed the troubling nature
of the actions of the Judiciary Committee against Judge
Rosenbaum.301 In a speech to the Board of Directors of the Federal
Judges Association he stated that “Congress has recently indicated
rather strongly, by the Feeney Amendment, that it believes there
have been too many downward departures from the Sentencing
Guidelines. It has taken steps to reduce that number. Such a
296

Id. at 13-14.
Kelley, supra note 283, at 24. See H.R. REP. NO. 107-769, 9-32 (2002)
for a complete description of the charges leveled against Rosenbaum.
298
Jason Hoppin, Drug-Sentencing Probe Worries Bench, LEGAL
INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 24, 2003, at 4. The subpoena would have included
“Rosenbaum’s
records from his cases since Jan. 1, 1999, identifying drugrelated cases in which he departed from sentencing guidelines. He also has been
asked to provide sentencing transcripts, the status of appeals, copies of all
decisions and the names any court personnel who helped in his testimony before
Congress.” Rob Hotakainen & Pam Louwagie, State’s Chief U.S. Judge Might
Face Subpoena; House Panel Investigating Sentencing in Drug Case, STAR
TRIBUNE, Mar. 13, 2002, at 1A, available at 2003 WL 5530675.
299
Kelley, supra note 283, at 24. See also Hoppin, supra note 298, at 4.
300
Kelley, supra note 283, at 24 (citing Jess Braven & Gary Fields, House
Panel to Probe U.S. Judge: Minnesota Jurist’s Records Expected to be
Subpoenaed in an Unusual Showdown, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 12, 2003)).
301
Chief Justice William Rehnquist, Remarks of the Chief Justice at the
Federal Judges Association Board of Directors meeting, available at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_05-05-03.html (May 5,
2003).
297
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decision is for Congress, just as the enactment of the Sentencing
Guidelines nearly 20 years ago was.”302 He also affirmed that
collection of information about sentencing practices is “a
legitimate sphere of congressional inquiry, in aid of its legislative
authority.”303 While Chief Justice Rehnquist approved of the
general authority of Congress to collect information in aid of
formulating legislation on sentencing, he went on to explain that
individualized collection of information on a judge-by-judge basis
“is more troubling . . . . For side-by-side with the broad authority
of Congress to legislate and gather information in this area is the
principle that federal judges may not be removed from office for
their judicial acts . . . . [A] judge’s judicial acts may not serve as a
basis for impeachment.”304 This principle, the Chief Justice
observed, has existed for nearly 200 years, following the trial of
Justice Samuel Chase of the Supreme Court by the Senate.305
302

Id.
Id.
304
Id.
305
Id. The Chief Justice remarked:
Chase was one of those people who are intelligent and learned, but
seriously lacking in judicial temperament. He showed marked partiality
in at least one trial over which he presided, and regularly gave grand
juries partisan federalist charges on current events. For this the House
of Representatives, at President Thomas Jefferson’s instigation,
impeached him, and he was tried before the Senate in 1805. That body
heard fifty witnesses over a course of ten full days. The Jeffersonian
Republicans had more than a two-thirds majority in the body, and if
they had voted as a block Chase would have been convicted and
removed from office. Happily, they did not vote as a block. . . . The
significance of the outcome of the Chase trial cannot be overstated—
Chase’s narrow escape from conviction in the Senate exemplified how
close the development of an independent judiciary came to being
stultified. Although the Republicans had expounded grandiose theories
about impeachment being a method by which the judiciary could be
brought into line with prevailing political views, the case against Chase
was tried on a basis of specific allegations of judicial misconduct.
Nearly every act charged against him had been performed in the
discharge of his judicial office. Instead it represented a judgment that
impeachment should not be used to remove a judge for conduct in the
exercise of his judicial duties. The political precedent set by Chase’s
303
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Aside from the Feeney Amendment’s intrusion into judicial
independence, the reporting provisions damage the protection
afforded by downward departures against excessive sentences by
potentially deterring judges from granting downward departures.306
Individualized assessment is a key component of a fair criminal
justice system because the process allows judges to review the
totality of the circumstances surrounding a crime to prevent unjust
consequences.307 Mandatory minimums have resulted in harsh
sentences by limiting the ability of judges to exercise discretion
and reduce sentences in appropriate circumstances.308 Moreover,
acquittal has governed that day to this: a judge’s judicial acts may not
serve as a basis for impeachment.
Id.
306

David M. Zlotnick, The War within the War on Crime: The
Congressional Assault on Judicial Sentencing Discretion, 57 SMU L. REV. 211,
234 (2004) (discussing judicial reaction to the reporting provisions of the
Feeney Amendment). For example, in a recent case, Judge Donald Molloy, of
the District Court of Montana, wrote:
I believe . . . that the Feeney Amendment, in seeking to strip federal
judges of their judgment, will lead to more unjust sentences and that
what we will end up with is a third branch of administrators heeding the
beck and call of those who have sense of justice reflected in the old
testament.
Id. (quoting Sent. Tr. at 26, United States v. Chang Gou You, Cr. 02-15-HDWM (D. Mon. Sept. 11, 2003)). Judge Martin observed that “I certainly hope
my former colleagues wouldn’t give in to that pressure, but look . . . judges
don’t like to be reversed. Some judges are more concerned about their reversal
rate than others. Some judges obviously are more concerned about the
possibility of being reported.” How will Judicial Discretion Change under the
Feeney Amendment?, supra note 158, at M12.
307
149 CONG. REC. S5113-01, 5119 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy observed that “[i]t has been uniform and
constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider
every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the
human failings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the
punishment to ensue.” Id. Judge Martin noted that “[f]or most of our history, our
system of justice operated on the premise that justice in sentencing is best
achieved by having a sentence imposed by a judge who, fully informed about
the offense and the offender, has discretion to impose a sentence within the
statutory limits.” Martin, supra note 247, at A31.
308
U.S. v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1022-23 (D.N.D. 2003). Judge
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the impact of the reporting provisions of the Feeney Amendment is
beginning to emerge in the federal courts. In the recent case of
United States v. Kirsch, the court determined that the defendant’s
case did not fall outside the heartland and denied a downward
departure.309 The court added, however, that there was an
additional reason why it refused to depart downward:
The Court believes that the day of the downward departure
is past. Congress and the Attorney General have instituted
policies designed to intimidate and threaten judges into
refusing to depart downward, and those policies are
working. If the Court were to depart, the Assistant U.S.
Attorney would be required to report that departure to the
U.S. Attorney, who would in turn be required to report to
the Attorney General. The Attorney General would then
report the departure to Congress, and Congress could call
the undersigned to testify and attempt to justify the
departure. This reporting requirement system accomplishes
its goal: the Court is intimidated, and the Court is scared to
depart . . . . Our justice system depends on a fair and
Rodney S. Webb, appointed by President Reagan and a former federal
prosecutor, of the District Court of North Dakota, wrote:
[T]he Court submits that the pendulum for sentencing within the
criminal justice system has moved too far to the right in favor of harsh
sentences. We must adopt sentencing goals beyond retribution and
deterrence. Our current system costs too much and we are in danger of
losing a substantial portion of a whole generation of young men to
drugs as their futures rot within our prisons. A society can be tough on
crime without being vindictive, unjust or cruel . . . . Perhaps this
opinion, as an appeal for a restoration of individualized sentencing, will
provoke some thoughtful discussion on these important issues and help
restore the traditional sentencing discretion of the district courts
usurped by the legislative and executive branches of our government.
Id.
309
287 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1006 (2003). The defendant was convicted of
conspiracy to defraud the government and making false statements to a federal
agency. Id. at 1006. The defendant requested a downward departure based on his
contention that his case fell outside the “heartland” because of his “strong
family, the history of employment, his strong community report, his education,
and his amenability to probationary supervision.” Id.
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impartial judiciary that is free from intimidation from the
other branches of government. The departure reporting
requirements constitute an unwarranted intimidation of the
judiciary.310
This type of reaction, though, is not uniform. Other judges have
rejected the notion of a judicial “black list” to threaten and
intimidate individual judges and affirm that the Feeney
Amendment will have limited impact on criminal sentencing.311
The opinion in United States v. Vanleer reflects this alternative
perspective.312 The judge based his notion that the Feeney
Amendment will have minimal substantive change on the ability of
judges to downward depart on two areas.313 First, the idea of a
judicial “black list” is erroneous because judicial departure
decisions are already a matter of public record.314 The court stated
that it was “not concerned about close scrutiny of its downward (or
upward) departure decisions by Congress, the public, or
otherwise.”315 Second, the Feeney Amendment in its final form
only restricts the ability of judges to downward depart in child
abduction and sex offense cases.316 The judge wrote that the
Feeney Amendment makes “one limited change in the ability of
district courts to depart downward in child abduction and sex
offense cases . . . . [A] prominent journal circulated to defense
attorneys seemingly suggested that the Feeney Amendment
‘essentially eliminates judges’ discretion in all cases. This
description is not accurate . . . .”317 In all other cases, judges retain
their traditional ability to depart downward in appropriate
circumstances.318
This view, however, ignores that all downward departure
decisions will be monitored by the Department of Justice and
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318

Id. at 1006-07.
See United States v. VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (D. Utah 2003).
Id.
Id. at 1323-24.
Id. at 1324.
Id.
Id. at 1323.
Vanleer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1323.
Id.
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Congress.319 This inevitably broadens the effect of the Feeney
Amendment because individual judges may be less willing to
depart for fear of reprisal.320 Additionally, the court in Vanleer
deflected criticism of the Feeney Amendment by contending that
the new system is substantially similar to the old.321 The individual
reporting requirements that have concerned Chief Justice
Rehnquist, however, are specific to the new system.322 The
argument as to the degree of difference between the two systems is
misplaced, however, given the addition of the monitoring
provisions. It is the potential for abuse brought about the addition
of the monitoring provisions that is problematic.323 Whatever may
be the philosophy of one court, the judicial branch deserves
protection in accordance with the historical and constitutional
tradition of judicial independence.324
319

28 U.S.C. § 994(w)(1)-(4) (2004).
See United States v. Kirsch, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1005 (2003). In addition,
Representative Conyers stated:
Now my friends on the other side of the aisle will claim not to worry,
that they fixed the Feeney Amendment which they will say is limited to
sex offenses. But the truth is that the revised Feeney language would
radically alter the sentencing regime for every single criminal case in
the legal system. It does this by adding a whole host of new procedural
requirements for a judge to show any form of mercy in all federal
cases. The bill also adds new requirements on the Justice Department
and the Sentencing Commission with regard to downward departures in
all Federal cases. At the end of the day, what we will have is something
very close to the original purpose of the Feeney Amendmentmandatory minimums in all federal criminal cases.
149 CONG. REC. H3059-02, 3075 (daily ed. Apr. 10, 2003) (statement of Rep.
Conyers).
321
VanLeer, 270 F. Supp. 2d at 1323-25.
322
See supra text accompanying notes 276-278 for a description of the
reporting provisions.
323
How will Judicial Discretion Change under the Feeney Amendment?,
supra note 158, at M12. Judge Martin noted that “[t]his was legislation which
was put on as, in my view, just a total attack on judges. And with an attempt to
intimidate.” Id.
324
149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6713 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Leahy). Senator Leahy noted:
[T]he Feeney Amendment effectively created a “black list” of judges
320
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C. The Feeney Amendment Overturns the Supreme Court
Decision in Koon
Two commentators have noted that the principle purpose of the
Feeney Amendment was to overrule Koon.325 Koon implemented a
deferential abuse of discretion standard, which recognized the
“institutional advantage” of district judges to determine whether a
case falls outside the “heartland” because they preside over many
more Guidelines cases than appellate courts.326 The Feeney
Amendment undermines the traditional sentencing discretion of
trial judges, as articulated in Koon, to make factually driven
sentencing decisions.327 It shifts sentencing discretion away from
that stray from the draconian mandates of the new law. The enacted
amendment attempt [sic] to intimate [sic] the Federal judiciary by
compiling a list of all judges who impose sentences that the Justice
Department does not like. Again, this provision is not limited to crimes
against children, but applies in any type of criminal case. It takes a
sledge hammer to the concept of separation of powers.
Id.
325

Paul Shechtman & Nathaniel Z. Marmur, Retroactive Application of the
PROTECT Act, N.Y. L.J., June 24, 2003, at col. 4. They cite Representatives
Feeney’s statement that:
[T]he Department of Justice believes that much of this damage is
traceable to the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Koon versus the
United States. In the Koon case, the court held that any factor not
explicitly disapproved by the sentencing commission or by statute
could serve as grounds for departure. So judges can make up
exceptions as they go along. This has led to an accelerated rate of
downward departures.
149 CONG. REC. H2405-05, 2422-23 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 2003) (statement of
Rep. Feeney).
326
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 98 (1996).
327
149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6711-12 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement
of Sen. Kennedy). Senator Kennedy noted:
[The Feeney Amendment] limits in several ways the ability of judges to
depart downwards from the guidelines. It overturns a unanimous 1996
Supreme Court decision, Koon v. United States, which established a
deferential standard of review for departures from the guidelines based
on the facts of the case-thereby undermining what the Court described
as the “traditional sentencing discretion” of trial courts and the
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district courts to appellate judges by changing the standard of
review from “due deference” to de novo.328 Judge Jack B.
Weinstein, of the Eastern District of New York, recently
commented that “[f]or a judge to exercise what amounts to original
power to sentence without actually seeing the person being
sentenced is contrary to American tradition, as recognized in
Koon.”329 Changing the standard of review to de novo further
reduces the ability of judges to exercise discretion in the harsh
criminal sentencing system.330
Sentencing data supports the proposition that district judges are
exposed to a significantly higher number of departure cases
compared to appellate courts, and this undermines the DOJ’s
justification for overturning Koon.331 The DOJ appealed only 19
“institutional advantage” of Federal district courts over appellate courts
to make fact-based sentencing determinations.
Id. Koon, 518 U.S. at 87.
328
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (2004).
329
In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (order granting
all sentencing hearings to be recorded by a video recording device).
330
Id. Judge Weinstein noted:
Passage of the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (“PROTECT Act”) carries
further the attenuation of the capacity of federal judges to do their work
properly by requiring the Court of Appeals to review de novo a District
Court’s departure from the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range. In
effect, primary sentencing authority is shifted to the appellate judges
whenever a trial court provides a lower sentence than do the Guidelines
matrices.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
331
Koon, 518 U.S. at 98. In Koon, the Court noted:
Before a departure is permitted, certain aspects of the case must be
found unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases in the
Guideline. To resolve this question, the district court must make a
refined assessment of the many facts bearing on the outcome, informed
by its vantage point and day-to-day experience in criminal sentencing.
Whether a given factor is present to a degree not adequately considered
by the Commission, or whether a discouraged factor nonetheless
justifies departure because it is present in some unusual or exceptional
way, are matters determined in large part by comparison with the facts
of other Guidelines cases.
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departure sentences in fiscal year 2001.332 Defendants appealed
340 departure sentences, which represents only 4.5 percent of the
total criminal sentences appealed in 2001.333 Furthermore, the DOJ
explained that the Feeney Amendment would facilitate government
appeal of “illegal” downward departures by requiring appellate
courts to undertake a de novo review of the case.334 Senator
Kennedy stated, however, that “in arguing for the abrogation of the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Boon [sic] v. United States, the
Department also failed to mention that it wins 78 percent of all
sentencing appeals, or that 85 percent of all defendants who
receive downward departures based on grounds other than
cooperation with the government nevertheless receive prison
time.”335 Of the 19 departure sentences appealed by the DOJ in
fiscal year 2001, the departure decision was affirmed 21 percent of
the time.336 The DOJ had a success rate of 79 percent, therefore,
which fails to suggest that the abuse of discretion standard has
hindered the DOJ in the appeals process.337
Not only are district court judges required to preside over a
significantly greater number of sentencing cases than appellate
courts, but the nature of the sentencing process places district court
judges in the best position to determine the appropriate sentence of
an offender.338 In 2001, 96.6 percent of defendants accepted guilty
pleas resulting in only 3.4 percent of cases reaching the trial

Id.
332

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM’N, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS, tbl. 58, at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm (last
visited Mar.10, 2003).
333
Id. at tbl. 57.
334
Letter from Justice Department Supporting Original Feeney
Amendment, 15 FED. SENT. R. 355 (Vera Inst. Just. June 2003) at 3, at 2003 WL
22208851.
335
149 CONG. REC. S6708-01, 6711 (daily ed. May 20, 2003) (statement of
Sen. Kennedy).
336
UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, tbl. 58, at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm
(last visited Mar.10, 2003).
337
Id.
338
In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. 262, 262-63 (E.D.N.Y. 2004).
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stage.339 The virtual removal of the federal criminal trial has
shifted discretion away from judges and defense counsel to
prosecutors, and placed significant emphasis on the sentencing
hearing as the means to evaluate the offender and the facts of the
case.340 A probation officer prepares a presentence report for every
defendant in a criminal case.341 In addition to using the presentence
report as a means of evaluating the defendant, district courts judges
are able to personally assess and observe the defendant and
interrogate the defendant and the defendant’s family members.342
339

UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, 2001 SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS, fig. C, at http://www.ussc.gov/annrpts.htm
(last visited Mar.10, 2003).
340
U.S. v. Speed Joyeros, S.A., 204 F. Supp. 2d 412, 417-18 (E.D.N.Y.
2002). Judge Weinstein noted:
The virtual elimination of federal criminal trials, substituting
administrative decisions not to prosecute or pleas of guilty, has
substantially changed our federal criminal law system. Increased
prosecutorial discretion and power have raised the percent of guilty
pleas . . . . Discretion not to prosecute for the crime committed is
widely exercised. Enhancement of control of sentencing by the
prosecutor as a result of sentencing guidelines and minimum sentences
has increased the government’s power to coerce defendants. There has
been a change from the paradigmatic concept of investigation and
accusation by the government of almost all persons believed to have
committed crimes, trial by jury with a strong role for defense counsel,
and discretion in sentencing by the court, to a system sharply reducing
the role of defense counsel, the jury and the judge, and whatever
protections they can afford a defendant.
Id. Judge Weinstein noted further that “sentencing hearings routinely conducted
following the entering of a guilty plea are the critical events in criminal
prosecutions.” In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. at 262.
341
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(1)(A). The presentence report includes, among
other things, the defendant’s history and characteristics, including any prior
criminal record and any circumstances affecting the defendant’s behavior that
might be helpful in imposing a sentence. Id. at (d)(2)(A)-(F).
342
In re Sentencing, 219 F.R.D. at 263. Judge Weinstein noted:
Those attending a sentencing hearing typically include the defendant
and defendant’s counsel, an Assistant United States Attorney, a
probation officer (who prepared the presentence report), a court
reporter, the judge, and the family, friends, employers, and other
witnesses for the defendant and for the government. If the defendant is
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Judge Weinstein explained:
The sentencing hearing normally requires that the
defendant be observed for credibility, mental astuteness,
physical characteristics, ability to withstand the rigors and
dangers of incarceration, and a myriad other relevant
factors. In many instances, it is necessary to observe the
employer’s and familial ties to the defendant. A judge
applies mental impressions of many tangible and intangible
factors when imposing a sentence. Many of these factors do
not appear in the transcript. The defendant’s words, his
facial expressions and body language, the severity of any
infirmity, the depth of his family’s reliance, or the
feebleness of his build cannot be accurately conveyed by a
cold record. Many defendants are ill educated and
inarticulate. They do not have the intellectual capacity to
articulate, as might a great novelist, what is in their hearts.
They are, after all, mere people.343
The sentencing transcript and presentence report are unable,
therefore, to properly encapsulate the district court judge’s
impressions of the defendant, which means that this type of
individualized assessment will be lost because “[i]t is unlikely that
the Court of Appeals judges would elect to require a criminal
defendant to appear in the appellate courtroom so its judges could
in fact revisit the sentence de novo.”344
The change of the standard of review results in the possibility
in custody, he or she is brought to court clad in prison garb, under the
watchful eye of the United States Marshals. Otherwise, the defendant
arrives in civilian attire. The closest family members are invited to sit
with the defendant so that the court may observe them and interrogate
them if necessary, and so that they and the defendant can furnish each
other with emotional support. Given that the majority of defendants are
charged with drug crimes, there is rarely a tangible “victim” in the
court . . . . [D]efense counsel, the defendant, the prosecutor and the
victim (if present) are given opportunities to speak . . . . The court then
imposes a sentence “without unnecessary delay.”
Id. (citations omitted).
343
Id. at 264 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
344
Id.
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that defendants will receive excessive sentences because appellate
courts lack the experience and opportunity to assess the defendant
and the circumstances surrounding the defendant’s crime.345 For
example, Dyck, a citizen of Canada, was a nineteen-year old with a
fourth grade education who served a mitigated sentence of 12
months for his minor role as “mule” in trafficking 85 pounds of
marijuana into the United States.346 Following his release, the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) ordered him to
permanently leave the United States and the defendant returned to
Canada.347 Subsequently, the defendant paid a driver to take him to
another part of Canada to visit friends.348 The driver decided to
travel through the United States because of the better highway
system but failed to inform the defendant of his plans.349
Defendant fell asleep during the trip but awoke as the car
approached the border.350 The border patrol officer stopped the
vehicle and the defendant was charged with attempting to illegally
reenter the country.351 The district court judge refused to impose
the 41 to 51 month sentence, which reflected his criminal history
category based on his prior drug trafficking offense, and sentenced
Dyck to 6 months because his case fell outside the heartland as he
was not attempting to reenter the United States to distribute
drugs.352 The Government appealed and the Court of Appeals
vacated the decision and mandated a sentence within the 41 to 51
month range because it refused to consider Dyck’s minor role in
the prior drug offense as a basis for downward departure.353
345

U.S. v. Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1016, 1019 (D.N.D. 2003) (noting that
the “district courts also enjoy familiarity with history of the case and reap the
benefits of face-to-face contact with the defendants, their families, and their
victims”). Id.
346
Id. at 1017.
347
Id.
348
Id. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) (2003).
349
Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1017-18.
350
Id. at 1018.
351
Id.
352
Id. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2L1.2 (2003).
353
Dyck, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1020. The district court noted that the circuit
court “fails to recognize the injustice of enhancing a defendant’s net offense
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The Feeney Amendment deprives defendants, such as Dyck, of
the wisdom and experience of district court judges. The district
court judge in Dyck observed this fact upon remand of Dyck’s
case:
In the matter of the sentencing of Pedro Dyck, this Court
enjoys the exact advantages over the appellate court the
Supreme Court was referring to in Koon. The Court is
located in an agricultural border state and regularly
sentences defendants involved in immigration and drug
crimes. The sentencing judge has over forty years
experience in criminal law as a defense attorney,
prosecutor, and judge; and as a judge, has sentenced
hundreds of defendants under the direction of the
Guidelines. The Court participated in all aspects of the case
from pre-trial matters to trial to sentencing. The Court has
met the defendant, conversed with the defendant, and
peered into the whites of the defendant’s eyes. The district
court is therefore in the better position to determine if this
case falls outside the heartland of cases.354
As noted by the district court judge in Dyck, the sentencing system
should afford district court judges the deference they deserve
because of their experience in evaluating the circumstances
surrounding the commission of a crime: “The need [in punishment]
is not for blindness, but for insight, for equity, for what Aristotle
called ‘the correction of the law where it is defective owing to its
universality.’ This can occur only in a judgment that takes account
of the complexity of the individual case.”355 District court judges
should be allowed to accomplish these goals.
CONCLUSION
Enactment of the Feeney Amendments does not reflect the
level for a prior offense, while failing to consider the role in the prior offense as
a basis for departure.” Id.
354
Id.
355
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 28, at 79 (quoting COMPLETE WORKS OF
ARISTOTLE (Barnes ed., 1984), 1796).
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legislative process at its best. Considering the devastating impact
the original Feeney Amendment would have wrought on judicial
sentencing discretion, it is remarkable that the House passed it
based on a mere twenty minutes of debate. Although part of the
reason for the enactment of the Feeney Amendment was due to
concern over implementing the AMBER Plan on a nationwide
scale, enactment of the Feeney Amendment reveals that the
Judicial Branch requires protection from members of Congress and
the Executive who fundamentally distrust judicial independence
and discretion in sentencing or fail to appreciate the moral
consequences of a sentencing system lacking the input of the
judiciary.

